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“A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step”. 
- LAO TZU 
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ENGLISH SUMMARY 
This dissertation seeks to advance the existing knowledge on China’s demographic 
transition given the current development of the country’s welfare state. In China, the 
recognition that changes to the welfare state must happen has begun to dawn and the 
country has addressed the issue by abolishing the ‘one-child’ policy and enacting the 
universal ‘two-child’ policy. Despite this effort, however, the fertility rate has not 
increased sufficiently. More relevant would be to consider social policymaking or 
enhancing the development of a ‘moderate’ universal welfare state.  
The research aim is trifold. First, the challenges to the development of Chinas social 
welfare system are uncovered. Second, we look into how the Chinese welfare state 
development has had an effect on demographic changes. Third, we examine if and 
how the development of a ‘moderate’ universal welfare state could relieve the 
burden associated with demographic transition in China.  
First, the dissertation finds that the main challenge to China’s social welfare system 
at this time is the hukou system or more specifically ‘social exclusion’. The hukou 
system can be considered an institutional logic of welfare segregation, in that it 
serves to stratify the population and control population movements, leading to social 
exclusion and dual citizenship status. A policy design which favours inclusiveness 
and ‘moderate’ universalism could foster equal social citizenship across China.  
Second, the dissertation shows that a long-term, sustainable solution should be 
found in a holistic welfare state approach to ageing – as has been the case in 
universal welfare states. This is only possible if China addresses the issues of elder 
care and increasing the pension age, while at the same time addressing issues related 
to declining fertility and gender parity. 
Finally, we find indications that the development of a ‘moderate’ universal welfare 
state could relieve the burden associated with demographic change in China, through 
a holistic welfare state approach to demographic change, meaning a policy approach 
which goes beyond addressing ‘ageing’ from the perspective of the elderly. China 
could take advantage of enormous untapped labour market resources and lessen the 
demographic burden considerably in the future.  
We acknowledge that much depends on regulating the pension age, labour 
productivity of the shrinking workforce and other incremental policy changes. 
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DANSK RESUME 
Denne afhandling søger at fremme den eksisterende viden om Kinas demografiske 
udvikling i betragtning af den aktuelle udvikling af Kinas velfærdsstat. I Kina, er 
anerkendelsen af at der skal ske reformeringer af velfærdsstaten begyndt. Man har 
blandt andet adresseret problemet ved at ophæve ’et-barns’ politikken og 
efterfølgende vedtage den universelle ’to-børns’ politik. På trods af denne indsats er 
fertiliteten imidlertid ikke steget tilstrækkeligt. Denne afhandling argumentere at det 
vil være mere relevant at anerkende betydningen af socialpolitiske tiltag eller styrke 
udviklingen af en 'moderat' universel velfærdsstat. 
Problemstillinen er grundlæggende tredelt. For det første, afdækkes udfordringerne 
for udviklingen af Kinas sociale velfærdssystem. For det andet, undersøger vi 
hvordan den kinesiske velfærdsstatsudvikling har haft indflydelse på demografiske 
ændringer. For det tredje, undersøger vi hvordan og om udviklingen af en 'moderat' 
universel velfærdsstat kan afhjælpe den demografiske byrde i Kina.  
Afhandlingen finder at den største udfordring for Kinas sociale velfærdssystem, på 
dette tidspunkt, er hukou-systemet eller mere specifikt effekten af 'social 
eksklusion'. Hukou-systemet kan betragtes som en institutionel logik for 
velfærdssegregering, idet det stratificerer befolkningen og kontrollerer 
befolkningsbevægelser, hvilket fører til social udstødelse og dobbelt 
medborgerskabs status. Et politisk design der vægter inklusion og 'moderat' 
universalisme kan fremme lige socialt medborgerskab i Kina. 
For det andet viser afhandlingen at en langsigtet og bæredygtig løsning bør findes i 
en bredere velfærdsstats tilgang til aldring - som det har været tilfældet i universelle 
velfærdsstater. Dette er kun muligt, hvis Kina adresserer spørgsmålene om 
ældrepleje og en hævning af pensionsalderen, og samtidig tager fat på spørgsmål, 
der er relateret til faldende fertilitet og kønsparitet. 
Endelig finder vi indikationer på, at udviklingen af en 'moderat' universel 
velfærdsstat kunne aflaste byrden forbundet med demografiske ændringer i Kina 
gennem en holistisk velfærdsstats tilgang til demografiske forandringer, hvilket 
betyder en politisk tilgang, der går ud over at håndtere 'aldring' fra de ældres 
perspektiv. Kina kunne drage fordel af enorme uudnyttede ressourcer på 
arbejdsmarkedet og mindske den demografiske byrde betydeligt i fremtiden. 
Vi anerkender, at meget afhænger af reguleringen af pensionsalderen, 
arbejdsproduktiviteten i den krympende arbejdsstyrke og andre inkrementelle 
politiske ændringer. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
China has in recent years been preoccupied with building a new welfare state, based 
on the concept of ‘moderate’ or ‘appropriate’ universalism (shidang puhui xing). 
This has been accompanied by a revitalisation of state funding and social 
policymaking on a scale never before seen, and the Chinese welfare state has 
expanded immensely. However, China is at risk of sinking into a void of 
demographic change that will pose challenges to the still fragile Chinese welfare 
system. 
China is far from alone. The world as a whole is ageing. Many developed countries 
are experiencing demographic transition at a relatively slow rate, whereas China is 
ageing at a rapid pace, like many developed countries in East Asia. As the popular 
saying goes, China is ‘growing old, before growing rich’. In the post-Maoist era of 
economic reform and record growth, China has succeeded in lifting more than 600 
million people out of extreme poverty ($1.25/day adjusted for purchasing power). 
World Bank analysts Ravallion and Chen attribute this achievement to China’s 
ability to reap the rewards of the agrarian reform in the 1980s. After the initial 
success following the early reform period, continued economic growth did not bring 
continued social progress to the same extent and ‘the low-lying fruits of efficiency-
enhancing reforms pro-poor reforms’ (Ravallion and Chen 2007, 38-39) are 
becoming scarce. 
Social progress has not kept pace with China’s economic growth, and the country is 
growing old before it has grown sufficiently rich to handle the burden of an ageing 
population and, more importantly, before it has set up an economically and socially 
sustainable welfare system. In many ways, China is a latecomer to social 
policymaking. After dismantling the old welfare system from the planned economy, 
China has been preoccupied with building a new welfare state – a ‘moderate’ 
universal welfare state. This development has been accompanied by major reforms 
within social support systems such as pensions, healthcare, unemployment and 
education (Frazier 2010; CDRF 2012; Kongshøj 2015a; Ngok 2015; Chen 2017). 
Recent five-year plans have repeatedly affirmed the aspiration to increase the 
coverage and generosity of existing welfare schemes and to reduce the inherent 
social inequity embedded in the household (hukou) registration system.  
From a comparative perspective, many developed countries have been aided in their 
demographic transition by established inclusive welfare institutions and, because of 
these, are better able to manage these demographic changes. This includes, for 
example, stimulating labour supply (postponing retirement and providing incentives 
to work longer), pension reforms and pro-natal policies. 
In comparison with developed countries, population ageing in China has four 
distinct characteristics: population ageing in China has happened while China’s 
economy is still relatively underdeveloped; it is ageing at an unprecedented speed; it 
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is the biggest older population in the world; and more than half of the older 
population live in rural areas (Cai et al. 2012; Du et al. 2013; Cai and Cheng 2014; 
Cai 2016).  
Although the willingness shown by the Chinese government to reform the welfare 
state shows faint glimmers of a rights-based approach in assessing access to public 
goods and services, there is still a long road ahead. The current set-up of the Chinese 
welfare system in some ways exacerbates the issue of demographic change in the 
country. First, a lack of sufficient care options is challenging women’s labour 
market participation, and the traditional role of women as caregivers is competing 
with women’s opportunities to earn income outside of the home. Studies have 
shown a steep decline – from 75% in 1988 to 57% in 2009 – in urban women’s 
employment to population ratio. Hare (2016) has found that household demographic 
composition – such as the presence of children and elders – plays an important role 
in women’s labour market participation. 
Second, the immense exclusion mechanisms embedded in the hukou system are a 
driver behind changes in family structures and the skewed demographic composition 
across the rural/urban boundary, where elders and children are left behind due to 
migration (Giles, Wang, and Zhao 2010; Liu 2014a; Xiang et al. 2018; Gruijters 
2017). 
Third, due to a lack of a unified welfare system or continual transfer system of 
welfare benefits, many migrants are discouraged from participation in the welfare 
system, as social insurance accounts in many instances are pooled locally (Frazier 
and Li 2017).  
Last, the one-child policy is often cited as the culprit of China’s changing 
demographic situation, although – as will be discussed in chapter 3 – this is not the 
case. Meanwhile, the unintended consequences of the one-child policy greatly affect 
the demographic situation. Due to a preference for male offspring under the one-
child policy, the sex ratio at birth (SRB) is highly skewed; some report it as high as 
1.21 in 2005 (Zeng and Hesketh 2017), meaning there are 121 male children born 
per 100 female children. There are two sides to this issue; first, the excess of men 
precludes a large group of the population from having children and, second, there 
are not enough women to maintain the traditional informal elder care traditions.  
There can be no doubt that policies regarding population containment and 
movement have been and will continue to be a major factor in determining China’s 
welfare state development, including its prospects for development. However, based 
on the experiences of developed countries, the development of China’s welfare state 
could have great impact on the country’s ability to handle and accommodate 
demographic change. Reforming China’s welfare system is a demographically 
pressing issue, as well as socially vital. 
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1.2 Research aim  
This dissertation seeks to advance the existing knowledge on China’s demographic 
transition given the current development of the country’s welfare state. Much 
research has been devoted to uncovering how demographic changes in China will 
affect the development of the budding welfare state and, in particular, the still fragile 
and fragmented pension system (Zeng 2011; van Dullemen, Nagel, and Bruijn 2017; 
Liu 2014b; Liu 2017). Little attention has been paid to how the development of the 
welfare state could affect the magnitude of the demographic transition, which seems 
paradoxical, given the extensive research on the subject within comparative welfare 
state research. In China, the recognition that changes to the welfare state must 
happen has begun to dawn, and the country has addressed the issue by abolishing the 
‘one-child’ policy and enacting the universal ‘two-child’ policy. Despite this effort, 
however, the fertility rate has not increased sufficiently. More relevant would be to 
consider social policymaking or enhancing the development of a ‘moderate’ 
universal welfare state. 
Based on the theoretical shortcomings in terms of examining social policymaking – 
in this case ‘moderate’ universalism as an independent variable – the overall aim of 
this dissertation is to examine if and how the development of a ‘moderate’ universal 
welfare state could relieve the burden associated with demographic transition in 
China. This overall aim is specified in the two following sub-questions: 
a) What are the challenges to the development of Chinas social welfare 
system? 
b) How does welfare state development affect demographic change in China? 
 
This dissertation consists of four articles: 
- Article A: Jensen, B.E. 2018. “The Hukou Divide: a Passé Construct”. Asia 
In Focus 5: 28-40. URL: http://asiainfocus.dk/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/AIF_ISSUE5_Jensen.pdf 
 
- Article B: Jensen, B.E. 2019. “‘Perceived Social Citizenship’: a 
Comparative Study Between two Different Hukous”. Citizenship Studies 23 
(2):172-188. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2019.1584157 
 
- Article C: Jensen, B.E. 2019. “Pension reform in China: what can China 
learn from the Danish approach to demographic change?” Journal of China 
and International Relations 7 (1): 21-43. Doi:  
https://doi.org/10.5278/jcir.v7i1.3541 
 
- Article D: Jensen, B.E. “Sources of support among the elderly in China: the 
changing roles of family and government”. Manuscript.  
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The four articles focus on the following three aspects of welfare state development 
in relation to demographic change: (a) the exclusion mechanisms embedded in the 
Chinese welfare system; (b) the development of a sustainable pension system (in 
comparison with the Danish model); and (c) the transition from informal to formal 
care and the continued importance of filial piety in China and the resulting 
intergenerational tensions.  
The research is thus linked to the role of state and family in providing both old-age 
security and care, in light of the ‘moderate’ universal welfare state, to relieve the 
demographic burden. There is no doubt that these three themes do not provide an 
exhaustive answer to the research question, as each article tackles a separate 
research area, however it has been judged important to gain extensive knowledge of 
the scope of the issues which could affect demographic transition, rather than 
gaining specialised knowledge within one area.  
There are certain advantages (as well as disadvantages) when examining these issues 
from a broad perspective. First, it allows us to develop a more comprehensive 
framework from which to examine the scope of the research question. Second, it 
allows us to achieve overall insight into the challenges facing China, which could 
potentially affect the demographic transition. Lastly, it allows us to view the Chinese 
‘moderate’ universal welfare state as an entity – although we recognise that the 
Chinese welfare state is highly fragmented – across the rural/urban boundary and far 
beyond.  
The summary report is structured as follows: chapter 2 addresses the methodological 
considerations and approaches. Chapter 3 describes the demographic transition in 
China. and relates theories of demographic transition. Chapter 4 presents an 
overview of the development of the Chinese welfare state. Chapter 5 sketches out 
the Chinese ‘moderate universal’ welfare state through the prism of traditional 
dimensions of universalism. Chapter 6 presents the findings of the articles included 
in this dissertation. Lastly, chapter 7 weaves together the different threads of the 
preceding chapters and discusses the four articles and the summary report conjointly 
to answer the research questions.   
21 
 
CHAPTER 2. METHODOLOGICAL 
APPROACHES AND CONSIDERATIONS 
As stated in chapter 1, the overall aim of this dissertation is to examine if and how 
the development of a ‘moderate’ universal welfare state can relieve the burden 
associated with demographic transition in China. The research design draws on both 
classic comparative welfare studies and demographic methodologies. Demographic 
methodologies are used to substantiate the framework, whereas the comparative 
focus is meant to add insight into the relationship between welfare regime theory 
and demographic change. This would also add richness to demographic 
methodology, which is basically institution blind. 
In terms of demographic methodologies, this dissertation relies on an approach 
known as applied demography to provide a framework for examining social 
policymaking as an independent variable. Applied demography is used to identify 
sustainable policy initiatives given current and future demographic development or, 
in other words, to examine demographic transition in China dependent on their 
welfare state development.  
The choice to assume a broader perspective is a partly a result of the circumstances 
of this PhD, the politically sensitive nature of the subject and the limitations posed 
as a foreigner conducting research in and on China, especially surrounding the social 
sciences. This approach also allows us to analyse and discuss the effects of welfare 
state development in a unique way.  
The chapter proceeds as follows: first, I briefly outline the theory behind applied 
demography and specify its application to the research field of this dissertation. 
Second, I discuss what we can learn from combining this demographic methodology 
and comparative welfare studies. Last, I discuss the data quality.  
2.1 Applied demography – the demographic lens 
Demography comes from the Greek and means people (dēmos) and writing about 
(graphē) – in short, describing people. Within the field of demography there is a 
general understanding that demography should be defined as the study of human 
populations in relation to changes brought by the interplay of births, deaths and 
migration, and is concerned with the analysis of the size, distribution, structure and 
characteristics of these components (Pressat 1984; Weeks 2008; Rowland 2003; 
Swanson 2015). The field of demography can be divided into two general areas – 
basic or academic demography and applied demography. The main methodological 
approach used in this dissertation is applied demography.  
Applied demography is a subfield of demography that emphasises the practical 
applications of demographic methods. It is particularly concerned with present and 
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future developments of populations at a local or national level. These projections 
provide vital information for planning and policymaking. By analysing trends in 
demographic behaviour, it is possible to predict the future characteristics of a 
population, which is essential for anticipating future social change and the 
consequences of current demographic trends (Rowland 2003; Swanson 2015). In 
short, ‘applied demographers tend to focus on the consequences of population 
change because they usually are involved in answering questions posed by non-
demographers’ (Swanson 2015, 839). As a discipline, applied demography implies 
the application of demographic concepts and methods to the solution of ‘real world’ 
issues. It is a way to describe and understand social phenomena, as well as to find 
possible solutions in complex social settings. 
Demographic methods solely focus on the characteristics of groups; while 
individuals do possess a demographic profile or are in a sense ‘victims’ of 
demographic trends, the interest is mainly in aggregates – studying a group, a state, 
a nation or the world as a whole.  
This knowledge is used to understand real world problems and develop solutions 
that are sustainable; this stage is defined as the ‘action’ stage and considered the 
final stage of applied demography by Thomas (2018). In this dissertation, policy 
changes or initiatives are considered ‘action’, and these could include incentives to 
have more children or developing health services for elders – if these changes or 
actions are informed by demographic analyses. 
2.1.1 Political demography and the case of China  
There are few aspects of politics that do not have a demographic dimension. 
Demography is used to determine political behaviour and political change, such as 
by profiling the electorate, among other activities. The relationship between 
demography and public policy, however, is central. Policies on, for example, 
healthcare and education will inevitably have an effect on demographic processes in 
society, just as demographic changes affect society (Thomas 2018).  
In China, an unequivocal example of this was the enactment of the one-child policy 
along with other family-planning policies. There is a symbiotic relationship between 
the demographic determinants (the perceived unmanageable population explosion), 
policy consequences (including the one-child policy) and demographic 
consequences. The intended consequence of the policy was to control population 
growth, but the policy brought about a number of unintended consequences such as 
a skewed sex ratio and an accelerated ageing burden. The fact that there are an 
‘excess’ of 30 million men in China has also brought about a slew of health 
consequences. First, the ‘excess’ men are at higher risk of suffering from mental 
health issues, and, second, the skewed sex ratio has contributed to an epidemic of 
prostitution, which in turn has led to an upsurge of sexually transmitted diseases. 
The heavy ageing burden is placing pressure on families and the welfare system 
alike, as families are no longer able to care for their elders following Confucian 
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traditions and the elder care and pension systems are still too immature to handle the 
growing burden. This is just one example of how demographic developments 
inspired policy change, and how the established change affected the demographic 
situation of the country, possibly in ways that we have yet to uncover in terms of 
unintended consequences. This will be discussed further in chapters 3 and 4.  
As mentioned earlier, China is currently undergoing unprecedented demographic 
changes, and these changes have numerous implications for public policy and vice 
versa, which in turn has implications for the needs of the population. Population 
growth has decelerated and the population is ageing, which has produced an age 
structure that is soon dominated by those over the age of 40 years. These changes 
have significant implications for the life circumstances of the population, in terms of 
healthcare, pensions and living conditions, among other aspects. In short, the needs 
of the population have changed, and the projections indicate that they will continue 
to change. Projections can stimulate innovations in policymaking and help 
determine more sustainable ways of meeting the needs of the population, or they can 
serve as warnings of impending developments that require policy interventions 
(Rowland 2003). 
In this dissertation, applied demography is used to create a framework where the 
demographic outcome is dependent on the development of a ‘moderate’ universal 
welfare state. The aim of this framework is to identify innovations in policymaking 
or social policy interventions that can ease the demographic transition. More 
specifically, we postulate that the development of a ‘moderate’ universal welfare 
state can relieve the burdens of demographic transition, through a series of mediator 
variables such as social citizenship, pension reforms or pro-natal policies, among 
others. 
2.1.2 Design: what can we learn? 
Accounting for demographic changes is not new in welfare studies. An example can 
be found in Esping-Andersen’s slogan: ‘pension reform begins with babies’ (Esping-
Andersen 2009, 9). Demography seems so far to have ignored the existence of 
welfare regimes, although applied demography does account for welfare systems to 
a certain degree. We aim to remedy this lack in the present dissertation. 
Demography can identify an issue, but public policy can inform of us of the scope of 
the issue and help identify solutions.  
To understand why family structures are changing, for example, we need to 
understand the policies that guide family formation. Fertility and family structure 
comprise an area of great discontinuity between national policies and individual 
goals – and it is important to strike a balance between a preference for large or small 
families and national goals to limit population growth or boost fertility rates 
(Rowland 2003). We need insight into policies regarding maternity or paternity 
leave, government subsidised child or elder care, as well as cash benefits (among 
other incentives) to understand demographic variables such as fertility. Just as we 
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need insight into pension schemes or labour market policies to truly understand the 
importance of changes in old-age dependency ratios. 
We distinguish between external and internal analysis. External analysis pertains to 
the actual comparison of welfare regimes, while internal analysis concerns single 
case analysis – in this instance, China.  
There are significant benefits of external or comparative analysis. If we merely look 
at the demographic facts, China is a young country and still has a rather large 
proportion of working age population in relation to the elderly cohort. In all 
respects, the situation does not seem too daunting. Even when we look at the 
projections, China does not seem worse off than, for instance, the Scandinavian 
countries. However, as we will discuss in chapter 5, the Scandinavian countries are 
well adapted to handling demographic change, whereas China is not. External 
analysis not only allows us understand the scope of a given issue, but also to learn 
from other welfare regimes.  
Looking beyond the comparative perspective, there are many instances where we 
need in-depth understanding of the Chinese welfare state to understand the 
ramifications of current demographic issues – and this is why internal analysis is 
important. For instance, demography informs us that China has a skewed 
demographic composition across the rural/urban boundary, as children and elders 
are left behind in rural areas due to migration. However, to understand the 
significance of this, we need to understand the fragmentation mechanisms embedded 
in the Chinese welfare system. This type of internal analysis is also how we 
understand how to remedy or lessen the issue under consideration.  
In this dissertation, I argue that this welfare state understanding provides ‘richness’, 
which is especially important when using applied demography. If we seek to reach 
the ‘action’ stage of applied demography – meaning that we seek to inspire policy 
change or initiatives informed by demographic analyses – we should understand why 
the given demographic trends are problematic. For that, we need to understand the 
set-up of the welfare state. Demography is used to describe and understand the 
social phenomena of demographic change; however, extensive knowledge of 
welfare state development, social citizenship and family structures, among other 
factors, allows us to find possible solutions in this complex social setting.  
2.2 Data quality  
We shall briefly discuss the data quality of the (a) demographic estimates and (b) 
Chinese statistics, as the quality of the data will influence what is analysed (Coast, 
Mondain, and Rossier 2009) . 
When working with demographic estimates, it is important to acknowledge that 
there is always uncertainty when relying on projections – it is a ‘best estimate’. The 
estimates depend on developments within fertility, mortality and migration. We 
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cannot directly evaluate the accuracy of current population projections, but the 
success of previous global and country-level projections can be examined. In this 
dissertation we have relied on UN projections, which, according to Keilman 
(Keilman 2001) are considered to be quite accurate. As an example, in 2010, the 
global population was 7 billion; previous projections were in the range of 6.8 to 7.2 
billion. 
There are of course many factors that will influence the rate of population growth in 
the coming decades. Projections become increasingly uncertain and tend to converge 
the further into the future they project. For this reason, we only use projections up to 
2050 in this dissertation.  
This dissertation also makes use of official Chinese data. There are some concerns 
that official Chinese date are simply unreliable due to bad data and/or are subject to 
manipulation. However, due to the absence of seemingly better data on coverage of 
public welfare schemes, for example, we find it necessary to use the official data. 
When possible, the data is assessed in relation to other estimates in the literature to 
mitigate some of these concerns.  
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CHAPTER 3. SETTING THE STAGE: 
DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES IN CHINA 
In this chapter, we will focus on demographic changes in China as well as policy 
measures, which have had a substantial impact on the demographic landscape, 
namely the one-child policy and other associated policy measures under Chinas 
family planning policy scheme.  
First, this chapter details the historical and contextual background of Chinas family 
planning policy scheme, which led to the enactment of the universal two-child 
policy in 2015. Second, we will examine major changes in Chinas demographic 
situation according to four aspects: ageing society, fertility decline, the only-child 
generation and skewed demographic composition. Third, we detail demographic 
transition theory and situate the Chinese demographic transition within this 
framework. 
 
3.1 Demographic changes in China  
China experienced very fast population growth over a long period, and in response 
to this the Chinese government introduced the voluntary ‘later-longer-fewer’ policy 
– encouraging later childbearing, longer spacing between childbirths and fewer 
children – at the beginning of the 1970s. This policy resulted in a dramatic reduction 
in the total fertility rate (TFR) – the total number of children born per woman of 
childbearing age – from an estimated 5.9 in 1970 to 2.9 in 1979. Despite this, fears 
of overpopulation persisted and the one-child policy was enacted in 1979. After that, 
the TFR continued to fall, albeit at a steadier pace (Hesketh, Lu, and Xing 2005; 
Zeng and Hesketh 2017).  
China’s family planning system was a tool to contain excessive population growth 
and lift China out of extreme poverty. Although the one-child policy was considered 
practically unenforceable in rural areas, where children were considered both labour 
capital and the main provider of elder care, the policy was strictly enforced in urban 
areas (Cameron et al. 2013; Hesketh, Lu, and Xing 2005; Zeng and Hesketh 2017). 
Demographers warned of the negative consequences of the policy throughout its life 
span (see e.g. Bongaarts 1985; Greenhalgh and Bongaarts 1987; Yi and Vaupel 
1989). Their critique centred on the fact that the demographic dividend was 
reversing and that the result would be accelerated population ageing, a skewed sex 
ratio and a decline in the working-age population.  
The Chinese government feared a potential baby boom if they lifted the policy. 
Instead, the policy has undergone several amendments (for a thorough overview see 
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Zeng and Hesketh (2017), leading to the abolition of the policy in October 2015 and 
the subsequent introduction of the universal two-child policy.  
The principal purpose of the universal two-child policy was, among other things, to 
address the challenge of population ageing by increasing the fertility rate. However, 
Zeng and Hesketh (2016, 1935) argue that ‘in the next 20 years the universal two-
child policy will have only a marginal effect on the rapid acceleration in population 
ageing if no other adequate policy actions are taken.’ In chapter 7, we outline what 
set adequate policy actions are.  
It is possible that China’s family planning policy has outlived its purpose, as the 
demographic composition of the country has changed dramatically. Most notably, 
the life expectancy in China has risen from 43.7 years in 1960 to 76.3 in 2016; at the 
same time, the fertility rate has dropped substantially from 5.7 in 1960 to 1.5 in 2015 
according to UN Population Indicators (UN 2017). However, it should not be 
ignored that the demographic composition is highly skewed in terms of sex ratio and 
in rural areas, where there is an excess of elders and children due to migration. There 
is also a high dispersion of life expectancy across regions.  
As life expectancy increases and fertility decreases, the old-age dependency ratio 
(ratio of population aged 65+ per 100 individuals aged 15–64) rises. At the moment, 
China remains unusually young compared to advanced industrial countries and has a 
national old-age dependency ratio of only 15.9 in 2017 – the highest ratio appears in 
Chongqing (20.60) – according to the China Statistical Yearbook 2018 (NBS 2018). 
In comparison, the European average was 26.4 in 2015 (UN 2017). However, China 
is projected to reach an old-age dependency ratio of 44 by 2050, according to UN 
medium fertility variant projections (UN 2017), depending on the development of 
fertility rates along with other factors. China has undoubtedly entered a period of 
accelerated ageing.  
To understand why China has reached this point, we must look back and understand 
the context within which the family planning policy was established. The founding 
of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 brought improved living conditions and 
healthcare, as a result of which the mortality rate (number of deaths per 1,000 
individuals per year) dropped rapidly from 17 per cent in 1952 to 7.6 per cent in 
1970 (NBS 1999). Given the drop in mortality, an increase in life expectancy and a 
high birth rate throughout the 1950s and 1960s of around 37 (NBS 1999), China’s 
population entered a period of record growth.  
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Figure 1 Annual growth rate of the Chinese population (per cent) 
 
Source: NBS 1999; NBS 2018  
* Data are missing from 1959–1961, which was a time of severe famine leading to 
an increase in mortality. According to the CDRF (2014, 4) the growth rate was 
negative during this time.  
During the peak in population growth rates from 1962–1975 (figure 1), China saw 
an average net increase of 19.74 million people per year (CDRF 2014). The fast 
population growth brought tremendous pressure on China’s socioeconomic 
development in terms of the educational system, housing and employment. In 
September 1980, the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee sent an 
open letter to all members of the party reading: 
‘If we do not spend the next 30 to 40 years, and especially the next 
20 to 30 years, advocating the practice of one couple having only 
one child to control population growth, the Chinese population will 
reach 1.3 billion in 20 years and over 1.5 billion in 40 years. […] 
Thirty years from now, the current severe challenge of population 
growth will have been mitigated. A different population policy may 
then be adopted.’  
(CDRF 2014, 8) 
Here we are almost 40 years later, now with the universal two-child policy. The 
policy was changed after the abolition of the one-child policy in late 2015, and as 
predicted in the open letter, China’s demographic situation is extremely different. 
The major changes are briefly summarised according to the following four aspects: 
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ageing society, fertility decline, the only-child generation and skewed demographic 
composition. 
Ageing society 
According to the latest annual data (2017) from the Chinese National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS), the population aged 65 and above has reached more than 200 
million or 15 per cent of the total population. The rate of population ageing has 
greatly accelerated, which will intensify pressure on society and increase the need 
for social welfare reforms. The UN has projected that by 2050 the old-age 
dependency ratio will reach almost 44 per cent (see figure 2). Chinese people are 
also living longer; as of 2015, the overall life expectancy at birth was 76.5 years, 
which suggests that China has stepped into an era of longevity. 
Figure 2 Trend of population ageing in China, 1950–2015, UN projections 2050 & 
2100  
 
Source: UN 2017; NBS 2018  
The old-age dependency ratio varies greatly across China. According to the NBS, 
the lowest old-age dependency ratio in 2016 was found in Tibet (7.01 per cent) and 
the highest in Chongqing (19.8 per cent). Similar differences are found for life 
expectancy, which was less than 71 years in Tibet in 2013, several years below the 
national average. In the more developed regions in China, such as Shanghai and 
Beijing, life expectancy has reached more than 80 years (The Economist 2015) – 
that is, about the same level as in Northern, Western and Southern Europe.  
0
10,0
20,0
30,0
40,0
50,0
60,0
70,0
80,0
90,0
100,0
Old-age dependency (65+) Life expectancy
31 
 
The economic reforms of the 1970s created an abundance of employment 
opportunities in China; a favourable population age structure, abundance of labour 
supply and enormous migration flows have made it possible for China to reap the 
rewards of demographic dividends over the past few decades (Bloom and Finlay 
2009). While the size of the Chinese labour force has been increasing over the past 
decades, the structure of the labour force has changed: it is ageing and the young 
labour force is relatively small in size (Peng 2013).  
Figure 3 China’s population pyramids 1960 & 2016 and 2050 UN projections (men 
and women, percentage of total population) 
 
Source: UN 2017   
*Note: Men are on the left and women are on the right in each diagram. 
As shown in figure 3, the composition of the population has changed considerably 
from 1950 to 2015, and the projections do indeed show that China’s population age 
structure is an old one. The picture is not, however, dissimilar to many other 
countries. 
The Chinese population has been fortunate to be able to fully absorb the gigantic 
baby boomer cohort (as shown in the 1950s population pyramid) with the plentiful 
employment opportunities created by China’s economic reform, which started in the 
late 1970s (Peng 2013). It is safe to say that China’s demographic dividend, coupled 
with the recent economic boom, has fuelled an already growing and dynamic 
economy, thus contributing to increasing output per capita and improving the 
standard of living (Cai 2016). This has in turn improved life expectancy and created 
a need for reallocation of resources. Changes in the population age structure will 
lead to a substantial increase in the resources that must be reallocated from the 
working generation to the elderly, as the expected duration of retirement rises. 
Individuals are forced to accumulate additional wealth or rely on transfers from the 
public pension system or a familial system of support, which greatly increases the 
reliance and pressure on future generations to support their elders (Peng 2013; Peng 
2016; Liu 2017).  
Within academia, there is great debate about how and if this development should be 
counteracted. Some suggest that the demographic transformation should be 
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understood as a crisis ‘because its ramifications are huge and long-lasting, and 
because the effects will be hard to reverse’ (Frazier and Li 2017, 411), while others 
suggest that the term ‘growing old, before getting rich’ has been put forth in an 
effort to rationalise and excuse social exclusion in rural areas (Du et al. 2013).  
Fertility decline  
Fertility decline is often considered the basic cause of population ageing; this is also 
true in China. In the population pyramids (figure 3) it appears that the ageing 
process has been twofold. From 1950 to 2015, there appears to have been an ageing 
process starting ‘from the base’ – this process can be attributed to the decline in 
TFR. From 2015 onwards, the process is a race to the apex, which can be attributed 
to rising life expectancy and a decline in mortality rates among the elderly. The 
theory behind this demographic transition will be explained in greater detail in 
chapter 3. 
Figure 4 TFR in China 1950–2015 and 2050 & 2100 UN projections 
 
Source: UN 2017  
China’s fertility rate reached its lowest point of around 1.5 in the 1990s and stood at 
1.63 in 2015 (see figure 4). However, there is general debate over the quality of birth 
statistics in China, and some researchers have argued that it might be even lower 
than reported here (Zhao and Chen 2011). Under the UN’s medium fertility 
projections, the TFR is projected to rise consistently to 1.76 by 2050.  
With the introduction of the universal two-child policy, China’s family planning 
policies received an intense amount of interest from the international media. The 
news was greeted with mixed feelings. While a potential baby boom could improve 
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the demographic situation, it would also place a tremendous demand on public 
services. Furthermore, several researchers have commented that China’s family 
planning policies were not the root cause of decreasing fertility rates (Zhao and 
Chen 2011; Cai 2012). This will be discussed further in section 3.3.  
A low fertility rate can lead to many socioeconomic issues; the main question on 
many Chinese people’s lips is ‘who will care for the elderly?’ It is a pertinent 
question, as China is left with an ageing population, a shrinking labour force and 
insufficient informal care options.  
The ‘only-child’ generation 
An issue related to declining fertility is that of the ‘only-child’ generation. The 
existence of the ‘only-child’ generation has brought a number of changes in family 
structure, intergenerational relationships, living arrangements and behaviour.  
It is estimated that more than 40 per cent of Chinese households, totalling more than 
160 million, are one-child families (Frazier and Li 2017). These families, often 
referred to as ‘4:2:1 families’ (four grandparents, two parents and one child), are 
facing a tremendous burden, as fewer or even one family member must support the 
entire family’s elder care and costs.  
The vast majority of urban children born after 1979 are a product of China’s one-
child policy. This has created a generation of ‘little emperors’: Chinese singletons 
have been the sole focus of their parents’ attention. Once grown, however, they face 
immense pressure as their family’s ‘only hope’ (Wang and Fong 2009). For 
centuries, Confucian tradition has dictated that elder care is a filial duty under the 
values of filial piety. However, the family capacity for supporting this behaviour is 
eroding due to the ‘4:2:1’ phenomenon, which has created intergenerational tension.  
Skewed demographic composition  
Since the 1950s, the Chinese Government has enforced the hukou system to restrict 
mobility and discourage urbanisation. China has nonetheless experienced rapid 
urbanisation characterised by internal migration, also known as the ‘floating 
population’, of around 244 million people in 2017 (NBS 2018). The urban 
population increased from 17.38 per cent of the total population in 1970 to 58.52 per 
cent in 2018, according to the China Statistical Yearbook (NBS 2017). Rural-to-
urban migrants are left on the sidelines; due to their status as rural citizens, they are 
barred from accessing the urban welfare system and are generally fully aware of 
their ‘marginal citizenship status’ (Chen 2017, 203). They have in many instances 
formed a new urban underclass living in poor migrant communities at the outskirts 
of major cities. While some (Gao, Yang, and Li 2013) see urbanisation as a potential 
driver for comprehensive and progressive welfare state development in China, many 
also argue that under current conditions, it is facilitating segregation rather than 
integration (see e.g. Wu 2011; Afridi, Li, and Ren 2015; Chen 2017).  
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The demographic composition of rural areas has also become increasingly 
disproportionate, as elders and children are left behind due to massive rural–urban 
migration by the working generation (Shi 2012). Due to migration, the traditional 
intergenerational contract has changed, as the elderly must continue to do a 
considerable share of the agricultural work and care for the left-behind children. 
This potentially creates a situation where land may be left uncultivated, resulting in 
poverty and increased dependency on welfare for the left-behind elderly.  
A further controversy is the degree to which the one-child policy has contributed to 
a highly skewed SRB. As shown in figure 5, the SRB in China for 2010–2015 was 
1.16, meaning there were 116 male births for every 100 females. It also appears that 
China followed the world average until the onset of the one-child policy and that the 
skew in favour of male births reached its peak in 2005–2010 at 1.17, though as 
mentioned earlier, some report it as high as 1.21 in 2005 (Zeng and Hesketh 2017).  
Figure 5 Sex ratio at birth (male births per female births), 1950–2015 
 
Source: UN 2017  
It is estimated that there will be an excess of 30 million unmarried men in the 
reproductive age group in China. Considering that marriage and having children 
remain a strong cultural expectation, these men are at risk of stigmatisation and 
mental health issues (Zeng and Hesketh 2017). There is also great concern about 
social stability, as these men are forming ‘bachelor cities’ (Poston, Conde, and 
DeSalvo 2011). The media recently been reporting how the demand for brides is 
endangering women living on China’s borders, as bride importing has become a new 
form of slavery in China (The Economist 2017; Asia News Monitor 2019).  
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The shortage of women is also affecting the quantity and quality of elder care. As 
mentioned earlier, elder care is still considered a filial duty in Chinese society. 
While sons are expected to support their elders financially, women are expected to 
provide physical and spiritual care to their elders. However, the one-child policy and 
a preference for male offspring have resulted in a deficiency of women to uphold 
these traditions (Zeng and Hesketh 2017). 
Of the four aspects described above, some are directly related to China’s family 
planning policy, while others are related to the social dichotomy manifested in the 
hukou system. However, one cannot argue that these issues can solely be attributed 
to Chinese policies – although the one-child policy was an accompanying cause (and 
a catalyst) for fertility decline – modernisation and China’s current status in its 
demographic transitional development has also played a large role, as argued by Sen 
(Sen 2015). This will be discussed further in section 3.3. 
3.2 New divisions  
China is in an era of new divisions. Many of these divisions are fuelled by the 
changing demographic situation and the causes behind that demographic transition. 
As vertical relationships across generations are expanding, horizontal relationships 
between family members have been reduced (Coulmas 2007). This is changing 
traditional Confucian practices such as the notion of filial piety, as well as affecting 
intergenerational relationships. Mannheim (Mannheim 1928, 283) describes 
intergenerational relations as  
‘the non-contemporaneity of the contemporaneous […]. Everyone 
lives with people of the same and of different ages, with a variety of 
possibilities of experience facing them all alike. But for each the 
“same time” is a different time - that is, it represents a different 
period of his self, which he can only share with people of his own 
age’.  
This sums up the root cause of intergenerational tensions in China today. Most 
societies have experienced tension at one time or another, as society changes, 
generations are also experiencing different periods of their self. In China, the issue is 
exacerbated by the rapid demographic change that has cascaded through the 
economy and society and has been aided by China’s family planning policies. 
The major trends of population ageing that is affecting family structures are people 
- living longer; 
- having fewer children; 
- starting families later; and 
- choosing the family structure that suits them.  
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These trends are encroaching on traditional notions of care obligations, family 
structure and living arrangements. This shift, in conjunction with socioeconomic and 
ideological changes, is bringing about a change in how the Chinese people perceive 
the family unit. The emphasis on the traditional parent–child bond is likely shifting 
towards an emphasis on husband–wife relations. China has, however, succeeded in 
upholding traditional Confucian family values for a long time.  
The multigenerational household form in which parents and children co-reside is the 
epitome of an informal support system and was considered the foundation of elder 
care in China for more than 2000 years. Today’s living arrangements have become 
more diversified, while the majority of elders still co-reside with their children or 
grandchildren, co-residence rates are declining. Instead, non-traditional living 
arrangements are rising to prominence. Examples of this include ‘empty nest’ 
households, in which older people live alone or with a spouse only, and ‘skipped 
generation’ households, in which older people live alone with grandchildren, due to 
migration of the working generation (Li et al. 2010; Gu, Brown, and Qiu 2016; 
Gruijters 2017). The old co-residence support system is no longer sustainable due to 
demographic changes.  
This development has not been sufficiently recognised in the past, which means that 
there are no adequate policy measures in place to handle the transition. In lieu of 
this, a report made by China Development Research Foundation (CDRF 2014), an 
official think-tank, has called for a new population policy that encourages 
adjustments to the family planning policy to enhance peoples’ all-around 
development. 
‘It calls for a new population policy that is characterized by 
“autonomy in reproductive decisions, encouragement of moderation 
(in number of children), emphasis on quality, and overall (family) 
well-being.”’ (CDRF 2014, 1) 
With the introduction of the universal two-child policy, the Chinese government has 
introduced a greater degree of autonomy in reproductive decisions. Meanwhile, the 
introduction of the universal two-child policy has not brought about the desired 
increase in fertility. It is a classic Catch-22. Due to demographic transition and, to 
some degree, the one-child policy, family capacity is eroding. Today, families are 
not having one child because they are forced to do so, but because they choose to do 
so. Greater reproductive autonomy does not change this. Population control has 
created a situation where it is no longer possible to control the population.  
Comprehensive welfare reforms to alleviate the burden are necessary so as to 
encourage higher fertility through pro-natalist policies, to encourage higher 
participation in welfare schemes through equal social citizenship and to ensure that 
risk and cost are evenly distributed within the welfare system. 
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China is far from alone. In the 21st century, many countries throughout the world are 
experiencing a considerable ageing of their populations. This worldwide population 
ageing is due to declining fertility and higher life expectancy. In most of the 
developed world, fertility has declined from moderate to low levels. In the 
developing world, it has declined from high to moderate/low levels. Some long-term 
projections show truly daunting ageing figures. At the same time, we are 
experiencing improvements in life expectancy. In tandem, low fertility and higher 
life expectancy will result in vastly ageing populations, and the old-age dependency 
ratio in today’s more developed regions is projected to reach more than 50 by the 
end of this century (UN 2017). 
Many countries are facing very high demographic dependency ratios, labour 
shortage and, in some cases, even population decline (perhaps modified by 
immigration). Most countries have not yet solved the challenge of financing social 
security and elder care for the growing share of elders. 
This development, which we will examine in the next section, is also known among 
demographers as demographic transition.  
 
3.3 Demographic transition theory 
Demographic transition refers to the movement of mortality (MR) and birth (BR) 
rates in a society (Rowland 2003). Since the 1920s, demographers have developed a 
five-stage demographic transition model (DTM), which refers to the transition from 
high BR and MR to low BR and MR, which commenced in Western Europe 
between the late 18th and early 20th centuries and has spread rapidly throughout 
much of the world.  
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Figure 6 Five-stage demographic transition model 
 
Source: made by author, based on Rowland 2003; Park and Allaby 2013; Thompson 
and Roberge 2015; Raymo 2015; Lesthaghe and van de Kaa 1986  
The classic variant of the DTM consists of four stages (1–4; see figure 6). The fifth 
stage will be explained below. The model shows how BR and MR change through 
time in a particular country or area, giving rise to phases of population stability and 
change. In stage one, both fertility and mortality are high. In stage two, the MR 
begins to fall (usually due to, among other factors, better food supplies, improved 
living conditions and better healthcare), while the BR remains high. In stage three, 
better education, better family planning opportunities and better career options for 
women cause the BR to decline. By stage four, the BR and MR have converged and 
they oscillate around a relatively low level. By the year 2000, most developed 
countries had completed all four stages (Park and Allaby 2013; Thompson and 
Roberge 2015). As illustrated in figure 6, however, the time is ripe for a fifth stage. 
Stage five is what happens when the BR declines to the point where it is lower than 
the MR. Although several societies have reached this point, they are still just at the 
beginning of stage five, so what occurs in this stage remains an unsettled question. 
Japan might be the best case to explain this, as they achieved a negative population 
growth rate in 2010–2015. Germany is another example of a society that has reached 
this ominous point of intersection between BR and MR. The impact of net migration 
to Germany, combined with the generational lag time associated with demographic 
momentum, has kept the total population from declining.  
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Figure 7 China and the demographic transition model 
 
Source: UN 2017  
From figure 7, it appears that China has entered stage four; the population is still 
growing and the BR and MR are converging. If we consider China’s demographic 
transition in light of the DTM, it supports the argument that China’s one-child policy 
is not solely to blame for China’s current demographic composition; rather, China 
was already entering stage three when the ‘later-longer-fewer’ policy was adopted in 
the early 1970s.  
This model was developed on the basis of demographic trends in the European 
countries, and it has previously been criticised for being Eurocentric. However, 
considering that many non-European countries have developed according to the 
stages of the DTM, this criticism carries little merit today. Instead, the model can be 
criticised for being ‘institution-blind’. It does not take into account different 
demographic trajectories for different welfare state regimes – although it is a core 
thesis in applied demographics that demography is also a dependent variable – 
depending on policies or institutions. The model also does not predict how long any 
regime will remain in a certain stage, just as it does not take into account migration. 
Due to these concerns, the model is mainly applied as a frame of reference to 
understand the current demographic transition in China in relation to other countries. 
This will be the focus of chapter 5. First, we will expand on the model. 
It is evident from the DTM that demographers have previously focused mainly on 
gross population growth, while long-term changes in the age structure have attracted 
less attention. Consequently, the DTM has been formulated in terms of MR and BR. 
Following this model, when the MR begins to fall, without any corresponding 
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decline in the BR, the population will grow. Eventually, as the birth rate falls to the 
low levels typical of modern industrialised societies, the rate of population growth is 
once again reduced. However, if we turn our attention towards age structure, we see 
that the impact of the demographic transition on age structure is equally strong as its 
impact on population growth and vice versa.  
These effects were (more or less) illustrated in figure 3 (population pyramids) 
above, which shows how the population age structure in China develops in phases: a 
child phase, a young adult phase, a phase of population maturity and ageing. This is 
also illustrated in Figure 8. 
Figure 8 Population pyramids under the demographic transition model 
 
Source: made by author 
In stage one, the child phase, falling death rates produce an increase in the number 
of surviving children. As we move into stage two, MR falls while BR remains high; 
this increases the number of children, as the cohorts who survive into adulthood 
become larger and children are more likely to survive infancy. This results in a 
concave age structure some 30–40 years later (stage three). In stage four/five, most 
countries will not only experience a fall in TFR, but also a reduction in the total 
number of children born, resulting in an increasingly convex shape. 
The process of demographic transition is always followed by a change in age 
structure. It is important to acknowledge this, as it allows us to analyse social and 
economic development in relation to that demographic transition. It also allows us to 
expand our comparative focus. The classic variant of the DTM addresses the nature 
of the long-term trend from large to small families; however, the model falls short in 
explaining contemporary low fertility and diversity in life cycle experience and 
family building behaviour in post-transition countries. This is where the fifth stage 
becomes relevant.  
This stage was first acknowledged in the mid-1980s by Lesthaghe and van de Kaa 
(1986) under a different name – the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) in their 
seminal work ‘Twee demografische transities (Second demographic transition)?’ 
This term was used to describe the emergence of sustained below-replacement 
fertility levels and accompanying new behaviours, values and attitudes in several 
European countries (van de Kaa 1987; Raymo 2015). 
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At the time, Lesthaghe and van de Kaa were not sure of this new transition that had 
been taking place before their eyes – as van de Kaa describes, they added a question 
mark in their title because ‘we did not want to hide that uncertainty’ (van de Kaa 
2002, 4). Their reference to this second transition was motivated by the fact that 
fertility had fallen well below-replacement levels in many countries, a phenomenon 
that was not explained in classic demographic transition theory.  
At the core of the SDT framework is an emphasis on ‘dynamic interrelationships 
between fertility rates, a constellation of ‘innovative’ demographic behaviours and 
changes in values and life orientation’ (Raymo 2015, 3486). In addition to below-
replacement fertility, the SDT describes the following demographic changes as part 
of its framework: postponement of childbearing, decline in total marriage rate and 
increase in mean age at first marriage, increase in divorce, increase in cohabitation, 
increase in extramarital childbearing and a catalytic shift in contraceptive behaviour 
(van de Kaa 2002). Besides demographic changes, the SDT focuses on the role of 
shifting attitudes and values that can best be described as a move towards a view 
that family formation is something purposively selected for its role in self-
actualisation under a wider spectrum of socially sanctioned choices, rather than an 
unquestioned part of life.  
During the first transition (stages one through four), attitudes and values are 
dominated by concerns for the welfare and prospects of children, and fertility 
control was a response to large family sizes becoming a hindrance and 
disadvantaging parent in their goal of securing a better life for their child. In 
contrast, van de Kaa described the driving force behind the SDT as individualism, 
emphasizing the rights and self-fulfilment of individuals – the child is no longer the 
focus, but rather childbearing is an option to achieve self-fulfilment (van de Kaa 
1987).  
In other words, the opportunities available to support (a) self-fulfilment within the 
family and (b) new modes of families (e.g. extramarital childbearing and single 
parents) become key as we enter the SDT and the fifth stage.  
Although this perspective is by no means universal, immigration does affect living 
arrangements, population growth, age structure and fertility rates (for a limited 
time). However, while we acknowledge the importance of immigration (in both 
donor and recipient countries) and the lack thereof, we believe that the relevant 
aspects can be captured in the somewhat open framework of the SDT. To 
incorporate this, we will briefly discuss the importance of immigration flow in some 
nations, as well as the lack thereof in countries such as Japan and China, in chapter 
5.  
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CHAPTER 4. UNDERSTANDING THE 
CHINESE WELFARE STATE 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to anchor Chinese welfare state development and 
examine the concept of ‘moderate’ universalism – our independent variable. First, 
we will detail the development of the Chinese welfare state from the ‘Iron Rice 
Bowl’ to the current development stage – namely ‘moderate’ universalism – thus 
providing the context for the longer historical trajectory of public welfare provision 
in China.  
Second, we will examine the fragmentation mechanisms embedded in the Chinese 
hukou system. The hukou system is of great importance in understanding the 
challenges associated with welfare state development in China and in turn the 
magnitude of the demographic challenge. In this chapter, we will not dwell further 
on the citizenship discussion, as these are well documented in article A (‘The Hukou 
Divide: a Passé Construct?’) and B (‘Perceived Social Citizenship: a Comparative 
Study Between two Different Hukous’), but merely outline the current exclusion 
mechanisms embedded in the hukou system and thereby also appearing in the 
welfare system. 
Third, we will detail the divides embedded in the welfare system and examine new 
challenges that have arisen due to rapid social development and extensive social 
policy reforms. Current research reveals numerous perspectives on how to interpret 
social policy reform in China; each strand offers a different view on the ‘changing 
nature of Chinese social policy in terms of the state’s retreat from (or return to) 
welfare responsibilities during the transition to a market economy’ (Shi 2012, 790). 
There are three main perspectives on which we will draw in this dissertation:  
(a) the ever-growing research field of social citizenship, which focuses on the 
development within the state-society nexus, based on a social rights approach to 
welfare disparities across the hukou divide (and beyond) in China (Solinger 2003; 
Shi 2012; Woodman 2016); 
(b) another body of literature focuses on cultural dimensions, with a specific 
emphasis on the role of the family in care-practices under Confucian values and 
practices (Cheung and Kwan 2009; Yunong 2012; Gruijters 2017); and 
(c) lastly, I will highlight a further group of studies that focuses on the development 
of social policy making in the shift from socialist to pluralist welfare production 
(Hu, Linsen, and Schmitt 2014; Kongshøj 2015a; Johansson and Cheng 2016). 
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Each perspective offers a distinctive viewpoint on the challenges posed by the 
current demographic transition in China. The three strands of literature are not easily 
separated; we cannot examine social citizenship in relation to demographic change 
without examining the key determinants of social citizenship such as Confucian 
values and welfare state development. Therefore, all three perspectives are taken 
into consideration in this dissertation.  
4.1 From ‘iron rice bowl’ to ‘moderate’ universalism  
Chinese social policy has experienced tremendous changes since the founding of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and has shifted from a highly centralised 
communist ‘Iron Rice Bowl’ regime into a socialist market economy. Briefly, one 
can speak of three phases of social policy development, which can be summarised 
under the following headings: the ‘Iron Rice Bowl’ period, ‘small government, big 
society’ and ‘harmonious society’.  
The first phase of social policy development, the ‘Iron Rice Bowl’ period, or the 
‘Maoist period’, lasted until the opening up and economic reforms under Deng 
Xiaoping in 1979. Under the centrally planned economy in China, modelled after the 
Soviet Union, welfare in urban areas was guaranteed through the danwei (working 
unit). Each danwei functioned as a self-providing ‘mini welfare society’, where each 
individual received employment and income protection and enjoyed heavily 
subsidised welfare benefits and services, including housing, food, education and 
social security benefits for maternity, illness and old age. This system was highly 
employment-centred and made up of ‘public ownership, full and lifelong 
employment, job creation, job assignment and restricted labour mobility’ (Leung 
2005, 50). 
The welfare system in China was ‘danwei-centred’ rather than ‘state-centred’. The 
rural population obtained minimum security through public ownership of land and 
was for the most part self-reliant. The introduction of the hukou system in the late 
1950s bound residents’ social entitlements to their place of birth. The hukou system 
cemented the rural-urban differences that have persisted to present day.  
The ‘Iron Rice Bowl’ guaranteed a stable standard of living through the work units, 
regardless of the effort put forth by the workers. The system came to be seen as a 
highly unproductive system after the introduction of market-oriented economic 
reforms in 1978.  
The second phase of social policy development lasted from the initial steps of 
economic reform in 1979 until the late 1990s. During this period, there was a focus 
on market-oriented flexibility, competitiveness and cost-containment. Previous 
welfare arrangements eroded, and attention to social security and the role of the state 
in the responsibility for citizen welfare were virtually abolished. The overall trend of 
this phase was marked by state withdrawal and increased out-of-pocket payments 
(Kettunen, Kuhnle, and Ren 2014). Although the phrase ‘small government, big 
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society’ (xiao zhengfu da shehui) was never publicly proclaimed as a slogan by 
China’s top leaders, the term made its mark in the discourses of government bodies, 
academia and the media in relation to the social policy reforms of the late 1980s and 
1990s. Faced with the prospect of the welfare responsibilities caused by the erosion 
of the ‘Iron Rice Bowl’, the Civil Affairs authorities decided to promote the 
initiative of ‘socialisation of social welfare’ (shehui fuli shehuihua) in the mid-
1990s. Unlike direct provision, as under the danwei system, ‘socialisation’ referred 
to ‘push(ing) the society and the people to carry out their affairs by themselves with 
the advocacy, regulation and subsidy of the government’ (Lei and Walker 2013, 20).  
Unemployment had been almost unheard of in the employment-centred welfare 
state; however, one of the more noticeable consequences of the erosion of the ‘Iron 
Rice Bowl’ was the eruption of unemployment, which peaked at 10 to 12 per cent of 
the urban population after the turn of the millennium (Kongshøj 2015a). The 
combination of high unemployment and the erosion of existing welfare services and 
goods created the backdrop for widespread social protests ignited by the additional 
social risk due to unemployment or less secure and protective employment. The 
protests emerged from a wide spectrum of pressing issues and catalysed a social 
policy reform that pushed Chinese social policy development into its third phase. To 
keep their legitimacy, Chinese policymakers had a sudden discursive turn with ideas 
of a ‘harmonious society’, and in 2007, the Ministry of Civil Affairs stated their 
aspiration to promote ‘moderate’ universalism in China (ibid.) with the following 
statement: 
‘In order to speed up the development of social welfare in China, 
China will promote the transformation of a welfare model from 
‘residual type’ to ‘moderate universalism’’  
The Ministry of Civil affairs (2007) translated in Pan (2019, 22). 
China thus entered the third phase of social policy development. The third and 
current phase can be said to have started after Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao took power 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Both the political rhetoric and practice changed, 
shifting the focus from pure economic growth–oriented policies towards a more 
sustainable and socially equitable approach – a move towards a ‘harmonious 
society’ (xiaokang shehui) (Kettunen, Kuhnle, and Ren 2014). The Chinese welfare 
state has been growing at an unprecedented speed since this shift and has played an 
integral part of the ideology of the communist party as a key factor in their political 
targets and discourses (Kongshøj 2015a). There has recently been a discursive turn 
in the Chinese government: the need for social policymaking has been framed in 
vague terms such as ‘putting people first’ or ‘equalization of basic public services’ 
(Ngok 2015). However, despite the ambiguity of the Chinese dream to build a 
‘harmonious society’, it evident that it is also a dream where the consequences of 
social risks such as unemployment, poverty or illness are alleviated, as well as one 
where inequalities in the population are less pronounced (Kongshøj 2015b). 
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Accordingly, a great number of social policy initiatives have been adopted in the last 
15–20 years. The main accomplishment, however, has been in expanding coverage 
to a much larger share of the population (see figure 9). 
Figure 9 Expansion of social insurance coverage in China 2000 –2017 (percentage of 
total population*) 
 
Source: NBS 2018  
*Total population in 2000 = 1,267,430,000 and 2017 = 1,390,080,000 
There is no doubt that the expansion of coverage shown in figure 9 is impressive. 
During this period, unemployment insurance coverage expanded by 5.3 percentage 
points (83.758.000 people). Maternity insurance extended coverage from 2.4 per 
cent of the population in 2000 to 13.9 per cent in 2017, basic medical insurance was 
extended from 3 per cent to 84.7 per cent of the population and lastly, basic pension 
insurance was extended from 10.7 per cent to 65.9 per cent of the population during 
the same period. 
These social policy reforms – and the substantial increase in coverage – signify a 
shift towards inclusiveness. The policies target some of the most vulnerable groups, 
not least rural residents, migrant workers and the unemployed. The aspiration to 
build a ‘harmonious society’ through the adaption of universal principles clearly 
reflects a more rights-based approach to assessing access to public goods than was 
the case during the previous two phases of social policy development in China. 
Despite great progress, however, old divides have persisted in this new era of 
welfare state development, just as new social challenges have arisen, not least those 
predicted to accompany the looming demographic crisis. 
We have briefly mentioned the hukou system above. However, the hukou system is 
considered by many (see e.g. Frazier 2010; Shi 2012; Gao, Yang, and Li 2013; Saich 
2017) to be one of the most prevalent challenges for Chinese social policy making at 
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this time. In some ways, it forms the foundation of the welfare system, as it 
determines ‘who get what, when and how’ and is a determining body of social 
citizenship. Due to its importance, we shall briefly examine the fragmentation 
mechanisms embedded in the hukou system in the next section. 
4.1.1 The hukou system and ‘the floating population’ 
The Chinese hukou or household registration system was originally set up to control 
population movement. However, the system has developed into an institutional logic 
of welfare segregation, as it segregates the population in terms of social rights 
according to their birthplace by assigning agricultural and non-agricultural hukous to 
individuals (Solinger 2003, 2006; Zeuthen 2012; Long and Li 2016). On a deeper 
level, it defines social citizenship through the exclusion of some groups from certain 
social rights (Frazier and Li 2017; Saich 2017; Jensen 2018). The hukou system not 
only imposes an inferior citizenship status in terms of welfare entitlements and 
social rights (Jensen 2018), but through active and passive social exclusion it also 
imposes perceptions of inferior social citizenship among the Chinese population 
(Jensen 2019). Not only are rural resident marginalised in relation to welfare state 
entitlements, the inequalities embedded in the hukou system are likely to constrain 
the agency freedom of rural residents, especially elders, in pursuing goals, that 
subsequently undermines their opportunity equality (ibid).  
The hukou system is tantamount to a form of dual social citizenship within the 
Chinese population. Indeed, the system bears some similarity to the discussion of 
citizenship rights in the EU between national populations and migrant workers from 
other EU countries (Kovacheva et al. 2012; Jensen 2018). Still, it constitutes a 
unique form of social citizenship in China, one in which a large share of the 
population is not privy to full citizenship.  
The hukou system has been relaxed in recent years and Shi (2012, 796) argues that 
‘The distinction of urban-rural resident status seems to be losing some of its 
defining power for social citizenship’ and that the demarcation mechanism of the 
‘within-without’ divide is changing its function from rural-urban to inter-regional. 
As harmonisation takes effect, status separation will be obliterated. However, while 
this is true for some regions, we should not underestimate the scope of the hukou 
system: the rural/urban distinction remains significant. A number of policy 
initiatives designed to reduce discrimination against rural-to-urban migrants have 
been enacted in the third phase of welfare state development in China. The largest of 
these programmes is the ‘New National Urbanisation Plan (2014–2020)’, which was 
the first national policy strategy on urbanisation. Subsequently, the State Council 
presented the ‘Suggestions for Advancing the Reform of the Household Registration 
System’ in July 2014 and laid out plans to relax the hukou system. While this has 
been considered a great step in minimising the inferior citizenship status rural 
residents, it will not change the conditions for migrants living in the largest cities in 
China, as access to urban hukous in megacities will remain strictly controlled (Chen 
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2017). The new policies aim to provide a decent standard of living for China’s rural 
population, especially the growing rural-to-urban migrant community.  
Recently, the main focus surrounding the hukou system has been the ‘floating 
population’ that consists of almost 250 million migrant workers (NBS 2018) living 
in urban areas with a rural hukou, which in many instances excludes them from 
urban welfare (Li 2017) and forces them to acknowledge their ‘marginal citizenship 
status’ (Chen 2017, 203). Being fully aware of their marginal citizenship status in 
urban areas, migrants are generally hesitant to identify themselves as urban citizens 
(Woodman 2016; Woodman and Guo 2017). 
Rural-to-urban migrants are subject to structural and policy barriers due to the 
persistent institutional segregation of social security determined by the hukou 
system (Solinger 2006; Chen 2017). The Chinese population thus remains locked 
into vastly different socio-economic structures in terms of access to public goods 
and services. Although the system has become more permeable, social citizenship is 
still rarely granted to migrants in major cities (Saich 2017; Woodman and Guo 
2017). 
How the issue should be handled has been the subject of some discussion. Cai 
(2011) has argued that the issue can be endured and that ageing – represented by a 
dwindling workforce – might be a driver for harmonisation, as labour market 
competition between migrant workers and urban workers will recede and migrants 
could gain equal access to social welfare. However, this argument seems very 
optimistic. According to Frazier and Li (2017), several Chinese scholars have 
argued that hukou reform to provide all urban residents with equal rights and 
obligations to social insurance, could mitigate the problem of population ageing 
through urbanisation, which would make it possible to use the demographic 
dividend and potentially strengthen the social security system in China. This would, 
however, require reform of the hukou system that would focus on providing social 
benefits to migrants to encourage them to settle in cities. This line of reasoning 
could, however, potentially worsen the conditions in rural areas, as the issue of left-
behind elders could be greatly exacerbated.  
4.1.2 Institutional fragmentation: the pension system  
As an example of the institutional fragmentation of the hukou system, we will 
briefly examine the social exclusion mechanisms of the pension system in terms of 
migrants. In articles A (The Hukou Divide: a Passé Construct), B (‘Perceived Social 
Citizenship’: a Comparative Study Between two Different Hukous) and C (Pension 
reform in China: what can China learn from the Danish approach to demographic 
change?), we have examined the social exclusion mechanisms of the pension system 
(among others) in terms of rural residents in general.  
The pension system has recently been tremendously expanded, especially with the 
addition of the ‘New Rural Pension Insurance’, which in 2014 was merged with the 
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‘Urban Employee Basic Pension System’ and now makes up the new ‘Urban-Rural 
Resident Basic Pension System’. Benefit levels are still very low relative to the 
‘Urban Employee Basic Pension system’ and the pension system for civil servants 
and public employees. There is also major concern about the sustainability of local 
government subsidies, and much effort is needed to improve the service and 
management of the new ‘Urban-Rural Resident Basic Pension System’. For a 
detailed description, please see article C (‘Pension reform in China: what can China 
learn from the Danish approach to demographic change?’).  
The weakest link in China’s pension system is the basic pension insurance for 
migrant workers; by 2013 only 30 per cent of migrant workers were insured (Frazier 
and Li 2017). The 2009 government Resolution for Basic Old-age Insurance for 
Migrant Workers (nongmingong canjia jiben yanglao baoxian banfa) proposed 
setting up an independent pension scheme for migrant workers that would allow for 
lower contribution rates. However, later that year, another government document, 
the ‘Interim Procedures on the Transfer and Continuation of Basic Old-Age 
Insurance Relations for Urban Enterprise Workers’ (chengzhen qiye zhigong jiben 
yanglao baoxian zhuanyijiexu zanxing banfa), established that migrant workers were 
to be included in the ‘Urban Employee Basic Pension system’, and were made to 
pay the same higher premiums as urban workers, despite their significantly lower 
wages (ibid.)  
Although the intent was to integrate migrants in cities and help them to settle 
permanently, fragmentation has created vast institutional barriers for the 
transferability and continuation of pension accounts. Migrant workers, in turn, are 
discouraged from joining and continuing pension programmes.  
The current set-up of pensions for migrants have many disadvantages, here among: 
(a) higher premiums deter employers from covering their workers; (b) lack of 
transferability discourages job mobility; and (c) migrants cancel pension accounts to 
avoid losing access to the locally paid social insurance contributions.  
4.1.3 Old divides and new challenges 
Armed with a basic understanding of the development of the Chinese welfare state 
and the hukou system, we can begin to uncover the problems that have persisted 
through the extensive welfare state development in China, as well as the new divides 
that have arisen in the aftermath. China has taken important steps towards increasing 
coverage and securing adequate social protection, but access to public welfare is still 
marked by old divides (Ngok 2015). Despite significant progress, major challenges 
still persist for this new ‘moderate’ universal welfare state. Social benefits have not 
kept pace with the general increase in income; the minimum standard of living 
scheme (MSLS) allowance is in some ways more comparable to the stigmatising 
‘Poor Laws’ of the 19th century in the Western world, the health insurance schemes 
are not equipped to meet actual needs and the pension system remains fragmented 
and inadequate, among other concerns (Shi 2012).  
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Lastly, and most important, the persistent institutional diversity of social security 
that has persisted since the ‘Iron Rice Bowl’ period remains problematic. This is 
mainly evident in rural China as a product of the rural-urban divide that has plagued 
China since the 1950s. A major challenge persists in balancing the supply of public 
goods and services in both urban and rural areas due to the longstanding segregation 
in healthcare, infrastructure and education (Shi 2012). This segregation has been 
attributed by many (Shi 2012; Zeuthen 2012; Gao, Yang, and Li 2013) to the hukou 
system. Despite great progress, China’s rapid economic growth has been 
accompanied by greater income inequality, where many rural households are still 
working for subsistence and basic livelihood (Lam and Liu 2014).  
While these disparities are thought to have been diminished in recent years as a 
result of the newfound focus on the most vulnerable groups in society, they continue 
to thrive among the migrant masses, creating broader social disparities and 
continuing the longstanding urban-rural divide (Shi 2012). 
During the process of welfare state transformation, China’s social security and 
welfare system has lagged behind the country’s economic growth. New problems 
have also arisen, including a widening income gap, aggravated social stratification, 
discrimination of migrants and left-behind children and elders.  
We should note that not only has provision of social welfare lagged behind 
economic development, but the institutional design of the Chinese welfare state is 
also relatively inadequate. Decades of economic growth have raised the living 
standards of Chinese citizens, but this rapid economic ascendance is challenging 
sustainable development in China, primarily in the context of high inequality, rapid 
urbanisation and internal migration. These increasingly severe social issues have 
highlighted the inadequacies of China’s social security and welfare system.  
China’s demographic challenge is another issue that will become increasingly 
important. As mentioned in chapter 3, the Chinese population is still relatively 
young; however, China’s old-age dependency ratio and life expectancy at birth 
suggest that they have entered an era of longevity. At the same time, the rate of 
population ageing has greatly accelerated, which will intensify pressure on society 
and deepen the need for sustainable social welfare reforms.  
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CHAPTER 5. WELFARE IN AN AGE OF 
DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE 
 
In this chapter, we argue that demographic transition theory is basically institution 
blind. Comparative welfare state theory, on the other hand, focuses on institutions 
and their impact. Accordingly, we briefly include a broader comparative context 
based on Esping-Andersen’s classification of the three ideal-typical welfare regimes. 
Except for the speed of transition, the challenges for the Chinese welfare state are 
not unique, and they are better understood when seen in a comparative perspective, 
including the difference between universal/social democratic and 
corporatist/conservative welfare regimes. The corporatist regimes have faced 
extraordinary trouble in handling demographic change. 
Finally, this chapter will end with a brief exposition on universalism in general, 
which will be used as a frame of reference to situate ‘moderate’ universalism within 
the general universalism literature. This chapter will draw on the experiences of the 
Scandinavian countries in terms of universalism, but the wider Scandinavian context 
will be omitted. A discussion of the Danish context and policy framework is 
discussed in relation to China in article C (‘Pension reform in China: what can China 
learn from the Danish approach to demographic change?’). However, China’s 
attempt at a ‘moderate’ universal welfare state and the current Sino-Nordic policy 
dialogue allows us to make assumptions about the direction and meaning of 
‘moderate’ universalism compared to the more ‘traditional’ understanding of 
universalism in the Scandinavian countries. It is a matter of compare and contrast, 
although China and the Scandinavian countries are unlikely companions. 
 
5.1 Welfare regime theory: ‘pension reform begins with babies’  
A crucial point of modern welfare state theory is that welfare not only differs in 
terms of public expenditure levels, but even more so in institutional terms. Esping-
Andersen (1990) identified three ideal-typical welfare regimes, clustering social 
provisions between state, market and family: liberal, social democratic and 
conservative. These names are based on the political forces behind them; in the 
present context it is more meaningful to refer to the relevant welfare models, so we 
refer to the following labels: residual, universal and corporatist.  
The residual welfare state is commonly associated with the welfare states of the 
USA, Australia and Canada and is characterised by ‘means-tested assistance, modest 
and inadequate universal transfers, or modest social-insurance plans predominate. 
Benefits cater mainly to a clientele of low-income, usually working-class, state 
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dependents’ (Esping-Andersen 1990, 26). The universal welfare state is most often 
associated with the Scandinavian countries; the guiding principle is universalism and 
decommodification of social rights to promote equality. In corporatist welfare states 
such as France, Germany and Italy, the state holds priority over the market, but 
relies on and supports the family as the main provider of welfare (ibid.).  
Classifying the East-Asian welfare states is not as straightforward. First, these 
welfare states have been given many different labels, such as ‘Confucian’, 
‘productivist’, ‘oikonomic’ or ‘developmental’ (Kuhnle 2011; Abrahamson 2017). 
What is common, for the most part, is that social policy is subordinate to the market 
and family. There is also a high degree of welfare stratification and low 
decommodification. Due to these traits, Esping-Andersen (1997; 1999) considers the 
East-Asian welfare regime as a hybrid between the corporatist (high welfare 
stratification) and the residual (low-level of decommodification) regime types. The 
East-Asian welfare states also rely on familialism, which in practice bears traits of 
the Catholic subsidiarity principle, according to which welfare is only an option 
when all other resources have been exhausted. The best example of this is the 1950s 
policy of the ‘three nos’ (sanwu) in China, which ensured that those afflicted by the 
‘three nos’ – those with no source of livelihood, no legal supporter and no work 
ability – were entitled to social assistance. This was later replaced by the dibao 
system, although in many places the criteria of the ‘three nos’ persisted well into the 
2000s in some form or another (Solinger 2018).  
Jones (1993, 214) sum up the essence of the East-Asian welfare regimes: 
‘Conservative corporatism without (Western-style) worker 
participation; subsidiarity without the church, solidarity without 
equality; laissez-faire without libertarianism: an alternative run in 
the traditional style of a would be traditional, Confucian extended 
family.’  
In the following, we will treat the East-Asian welfare regime as a hybrid, following 
Esping-Andersen (1990; 1997; 1999). Although we also acknowledge that as a 
hybrid, the essence of the East-Asian welfare regimes is not captured in Esping-
Andersen’s 1990 ‘three worlds’ model and as such, we will consider it 
independently under the label ‘East-Asian hybrids’. We are by no means arguing 
that all traits of the East-Asian welfare regimes are captured under this label – just as 
with the original three welfare models, it is an ideal-type.  
The criteria of social rights are vastly different in the four ideal-typical welfare 
regimes. In corporatist welfare states, entitlements depend on contributions from an 
‘achievement-performance’ principle. This is also the case in the East-Asian hybrid 
regime, though social rights are not nearly as extensive as in the corporatist regime. 
Within the residual model, public welfare is based on the ‘Robin Hood principle’: 
support is targeted at the poor. In universal systems, the basic criterion is citizenship. 
All citizens for whom support is relevant are entitled to receive it. As explained 
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earlier, universalism is oriented towards equal citizenship rather than full equality – 
enabling all citizens to participate in social, political and cultural life.  
In terms of their conception and evaluation of social policy and decommodification, 
these welfare regimes differ in various ways. Esping-Andersen (1990, 47) makes the 
following specifications:  
It is in the quality and arrangement of social rights, not in their 
existence per se, that we can identify a distinct social approach. In 
contrast to the conservative models, dependence on family, 
morality, or authority is not the substitute for market dependence; 
the notion is rather that of individual independence. And, in 
contrast to liberalism, socialism’s aim is to maximize and 
institutionalize rights. Where the fully developed socialist paradigm 
is pursued, it should, in principle, facilitate a deproletarianization 
of the worker’s status: the worker’s relationship to work will begin 
to approximate what privileged strata (such as the civil service) had 
enjoyed for decades and even centuries. 
In other words, how the responsibility of providing social welfare is distributed 
between state, market and family determines how social rights are manifested in 
society. It also greatly affects who bears the burden of demographic change and how 
society is set up to handle demographic change. Welfare states differ significantly 
regarding their approach to demographic change. Due to large differences in fertility 
rates and net migration, countries are facing vastly different futures of ageing. How 
they meet the challenges of today will influence how severe these changes will be in 
the future.  
The universal Scandinavian welfare states, in particular, have been proactive, both in 
changing their pension and retirement systems and introducing pro-natal policies. 
Not least because of the perceived challenge of ageing, the Scandinavian countries 
have reformed their pension and retirement systems, increased labour supply and 
introduced pro-natal policies that, alongside net immigration, are ensuring that the 
changes in the demographic structure will be less pronounced than in most other 
European countries. This has, roughly speaking, secured the ‘foundations of the 
universal Nordic welfare model’ (Andersen and Hatland 2014, 285).  
Many ageing countries have adopted encompassing policy reforms to address their 
demographic challenges. This includes initiatives to stimulate labour supply, 
initiatives to postpone retirement, pension reforms with higher pension age, lower 
pensions or both. However, the policy choice among many countries experiencing 
low fertility rates has been the adoption of pro-natalist policies – that is, policies that 
advocates child bearing. Such measures include longer maternity and/or paternity 
leave, fertility allowances and government-subsidised childcare, and so forth. 
Regulating fertility is a solid strategy for meeting demographic changes, as stated by 
Esping-Andersen: ‘pension reform begins with babies’ (Esping-Andersen 2009, 9). 
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Uncertainty remains, however, about the best strategy to regulate fertility; some 
countries provide incentives via cash benefits, while others provide high quality and 
affordable childcare facilities.  
While increasing fertility rates could provide stability in the end, there is no doubt 
that a more encompassing policy scheme is necessary in the short term. Investing in 
healthcare, promoting gender equality and improving pension coverage and 
generosity are important initiatives to aid the demographic transition. In terms of 
demographic change and in light of the demographic transition, the utmost social 
challenge faced by welfare states is insufficient childcare – however, as the 
demographic composition of many traditionally family-oriented welfare states is 
becoming increasingly skewed with a greying population, elder care has also 
emerged as an important social challenge.  
De-familialisation is a trend that has swept across all four welfare regime types. 
Family structures have changed from single-earner families towards dual-earner 
families. Meanwhile, this is not surprising as the SDT framework emphasised 
‘‘innovative’ demographic behaviours and changes in values and life orientation’ as 
a key part of its framework. This dimension was adopted in a later version of 
Esping-Andersen’s theory (Esping-Andersen 1999). The traditional family structure 
has been eroding everywhere, even in corporatist regimes where conservative 
policies have aimed at maintaining the male breadwinner model; women have 
massively entered the labour market. The same is true in the East-Asian hybrid 
regime, where the practice of filial piety is being challenged by demographic change 
and changes in family structure and values.  
Welfare states are faced with two large economic challenges: first, sustaining 
pressure for improved public childcare and second, low fertility rates that contribute 
to aggravate the issue of ageing. Not all regimes are fit to meet these challenges, as 
stated by Andersen (2012, 20) ‘While the Nordic countries have solved these 
problems, most welfare states muddle through with some improvements in a context 
of long-term austerity.’ Although it should be noted that many welfare states are 
improving at this time.  
Scandinavian countries were first to change their tax system towards treating the 
individual as the basic unit, rather than advantaging families that have their income 
concentrated on one person. This process was deliberately delayed in corporatist 
welfare states, but pressure from well-educated women and daunting demographic 
forecasts have created a push towards modernisation and a change in family values 
(Andersen 2012). A lack of childcare facilities has resulted in low fertility – which 
in turn aggravates the long-term challenges of ageing populations (Esping - 
Andersen 1999). In residual welfare states, women’s labour market participation has 
been welcomed, although it has not been much supported by high-quality, affordable 
public childcare facilities (Andersen 2012). 
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While fertility is one major factor in the relationship between demographic change 
and the welfare state, another is immigration. As mentioned earlier, Germany and 
Japan are both examples of countries that have long ago reached the worrying point 
of intersection between BR and MR. Their challenges are vastly different, however, 
mainly because of immigration. In Germany, net migration combined with 
generational lag time has kept the total population from declining with a somewhat 
extraordinary population growth rate of 0.4 in 2017 (WB 2017). Japan has some of 
the strictest immigration policies in the world, and although they have experienced a 
net growth of foreign residents over the past six years, mainly originating from other 
East-Asian countries, the total population is declining with a growth rate of −0.2 in 
2017 (WB 2017). Japan also faces an additional challenge. Although Japan was the 
first country in the world to reach the second demographic transition turning point, 
this change in family values, as mentioned earlier, has manifested differently in 
Japan compared to many other countries, as cohabitation and extramarital births are 
rare. Marriages continue to be late and fewer people are getting married (van de Kaa 
2002). The reason is likely that, under present conditions, marriage is not a very 
attractive proposition for Japanese women, as long as a non-cohabitating 
relationship offers a decent alternative. 
Though we classify the East-Asian welfare states as a ‘hybrid’ between the residual 
and the corporatist model, China has aspirations of achieving a ‘moderate’ universal 
welfare state, as mentioned earlier. However, ‘moderate’ universalism as a concept 
in Chinese policymaking lacks a coherent definition and, at this point in time, it may 
merely be a discourse or aspiration. Nonetheless, the concept plays a pivotal role in 
current policy reforms in China and could potentially play an important role in 
Chinas future demographic situation, as universalism supports an institutional setup 
that is well-adapt to handling demographic change (Andersen & Hatland 2014). 
Rather than attempting to define the concept, however, we shall examine it as a 
contextually dependent phenomenon. Given the varieties of historical, political, 
social and economic prerequisites, not to mention cultural contexts, there are many 
different understandings of universalism.  
 
5.2 ‘Varieties of universalism’  
Universalism is a concept that has been commonly used in social policy and welfare 
state literature since the 1950s. Universalism came about as an attempt to break with 
the stigmatisation of poor relief and dispersed insurance funds by creating social 
insurance that covered the entire population. The concept later developed into 
encompassing the promotion of equality and solidarity between classes and between 
men and women through universal access to social goods (Anttonen, Haikio, and 
Sipila 2012). 
As mentioned above, universalism is most often associated with the Scandinavian 
welfare state model (Esping-Andersen 1990) and by some it is even considered 
synonymous with words such as ‘Nordic’, ‘Scandinavian’ and ‘social democratic’ 
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(Anttonen, Haikio, and Stefánsson 2012). This has also been made obvious by the 
Chinese interest in the Scandinavian countries and the uprising of a Sino-Nordic 
policy dialogue. This has led to a curious fallacy according to which characteristics 
of the Scandinavian model come to be regarded as features of universalism. 
However, being Scandinavian cannot itself be a criterion of universalism, as 
specified by Stefánsson (2012).  
Despite this, the Scandinavian countries are seen by many as the realisation of the 
universal welfare model, characterised by, among other things, a comprehensive 
system of municipal care arrangements for the elderly and children. The state 
guarantees childcare, ensuring that parents can secure care in public nurseries or 
kindergartens. The Scandinavian welfare states promote equality and solidarity 
between genders, classes and regions through universal access to public services. 
The Scandinavian countries have established relatively developed and 
comprehensive welfare systems and a policy framework under the influence of the 
collective bargaining of labour unions. Providing social welfare to all members of 
society also reflects a nation’s acknowledgement of their responsibility in building 
up the welfare state and in promoting social equality.  
As discussed above, even in Scandinavian countries, however, we cannot speak of 
universalism as a single concept; rather, we must speak of ‘varieties of 
universalism’, as the Nordic welfare states in practice do not fulfil all of their 
universalistic ambitions (Anttonen, Haikio, and Stefánsson 2012, 187). The 
Scandinavian welfare states have been clustered based on similarities in their 
institutional designs, but it is important to recognise that, despite similarities, these 
welfare states are different.  
Rothstein (Rothstein 1998) has argued that universalism, understood as a given 
policy applied to everyone, could be extended to cover entire welfare systems. In 
this sense, the more social goods or programmes that are universal, the more 
universal the welfare state is considered to be. In this view, we must allow for 
varieties of universalism, or at least an understanding that universalism is a matter of 
degree at the welfare system level. By this definition, there are welfare states that are 
either more or less universal – and Scandinavian welfare states are among the more 
universal. When universalism is used in terms of national welfare models rather than 
as a characteristic of a specific benefit, it becomes more complex and thus less 
precise. Erikson et al. (1987, viii) described this phenomenon in relation to the 
Scandinavian model: 
‘Social policy studies […] have repeatedly demonstrated that the 
Scandinavian Model looks better on paper than in real life and that 
it does not always perform according to its ideals. […] Many social 
programs are less universal than the ideology would suggest […].’  
What Erikson et al. argue is that universalism, even in the Scandinavian model, is an 
ideal or an ideal type. This ideal of universalism has inspired the construction of the 
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Scandinavian policy model and the way in which benefits are distributed; many 
social policies within the Scandinavian welfare states can be described as being 
universal, but not all of them. The Scandinavian model refers to the egalitarian 
outcome of policies that strive to uphold the universal ideal. It is an outcome in 
which marginalised groups become part of the social policy contract. This approach 
to universalism is considered a consequentialist understanding of the concept, while 
others are considered procedural. The difference lies in the understanding of whether 
universalism should be defined by how social goods are distributed or by the 
outcome of set distribution (Anttonen, Haikio, and Stefánsson 2012). 
Anttonen, Häikiö and Stefánson (2012, 187) argue that, despite the historical 
significance and widely discussed nature of universalism, it has never been 
complete. 
‘Historically universalism has been favoured as a means to achieve 
efficient social administration, unconditional security for people 
with low incomes, social integration and social cohesion of a 
society […]. However, universalism is not a panacea. It does not 
supersede targeted social protection and third-sector charity. The 
concept itself is open to contextual reinterpretations and 
decontestations. This suggests that universalism has never been 
complete. It is rather an ideal type that is always beyond reach.’ 
When we talk about ‘contextual’ reinterpretations it refers to universalism as a 
‘spectrum’, however, it also refers to the concept of ‘sufficiency’ of welfare benefits. 
What constitutes full membership of a community is highly different in different 
societies and subject to change over time. As argued by Andersen and Larsen 
(2015), to have a computer and access to the internet was once a luxury good; today, 
however, in many parts of the world at least, such access is considered a necessity to 
fully participate in society.  
Sufficiency is understood in line with Marshall’s (1950) notion of social citizenship. 
According to Marshall, social rights refer to what is needed by citizens to be 
acknowledged as full members of a community, to fully share in the social heritage 
and to live a life according to the prevailing standards in society. Embedded in this 
understanding is the rationalisation that individuals can live a life according to 
prevailing standards where they do not find it necessary to supplement their social 
services through market offers (ibid.). This is supported by Titmuss (2006, 129, 
emphasis added), who described the introduction of universalism as such: 
‘One fundamental historical reason for the adaption of this 
principle [universalism] was the aim of making services available 
and accessible to the whole population in such ways as would not 
involve users in any humiliating loss of status, dignity or self 
respects. There should be no sense of inferiority, pauperism, shame 
or stigma in the use of publicly provided service.’ 
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It is clear from Marshall and Titmuss that the essence of universal benefits is to 
provide the population with a dignified life, rather than ‘survival’. Such a life allows 
them to take part in society and enjoy a full citizenship status according to the 
general standard of living in that given society, and furthermore, they should be able 
to do so without experiencing stigma, hardship or need.  
In this dissertation, we view universalism as a spectrum rather than an ideal; 
furthermore, we assert that universalism should inspire egalitarianism and account 
for a person’s position in the human life-circle. Lastly, we consider some degree of 
adequacy necessary for the concept of universalism to serve as a useful analytical 
tool in practical research. This brings the concept closer to Marshall’s notion of 
(full) social citizenship. However, we also reserve the right to view universalism as 
a concept that is contextually and historically dependent. In line with this thinking, 
we will examine the Chinese concept of ‘moderate’ universalism, with the 
acknowledgement that universalism is an ideal type and to some degree open to 
interpretation.  
As China has looked towards the Nordic countries in an attempt to build a 
‘moderate’ universal welfare state, we must assume that they have an understanding 
of universalism as consequentialist rather than procedural. Consequently, we must 
assume that the intent behind major Chinese welfare state reforms is to secure more 
than the margin of subsistence for their citizens. We will examine these assumptions 
further in the next section. 
5.2.2 Teething troubles – a universal welfare state in the making? 
As explained in chapter 4, China’s recent social policy agenda has shifted towards 
the inclusion of larger proportions of the population, as well as the most vulnerable 
groups in society. However, we might question whether the development of the 
Chinese welfare state is following Scandinavian (i.e. universal) patterns of welfare 
state development. There are similarities in the desire to create policies with an 
egalitarian focus and widening the scope of state responsibility for welfare. 
However, the underlying understanding of welfare might be different, as are the 
social challenges faced by China and the Scandinavian countries.  
China has made great strides in expanding public welfare goods to all citizens. This 
is above all evident within the field of healthcare. Over the past decade, the Chinese 
government has adopted programmes such as the Urban Employee Basic Medical 
Insurance (UEBMI), the New Rural Cooperative Medical Insurance (NRCMI) and 
the Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance (URBMI). These schemes have 
incorporated the working population as well as the non-working urban and rural 
resident into the health insurance system and resulted in a dramatic expansion of 
social health insurance coverage. As shown in figure 9, ‘basic medical insurance’ 
coverage has been extended to 84.7 per cent of the population in 2017.  
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At the same time, there has been a substantial increase in generosity (measured by 
per capita expenditures for social health insurance). A study conducted by Huang 
(2015) concludes, however, that this expansion has been remarkably uneven across 
regions in China, both in terms of population coverage and generosity. Huang 
reports that the compensation rate in the period 2007–2010 varied from 
approximately 400–1852 yuan/person across the country. Despite this, Tang et al. 
(2012) have noted a decline in private expenditure after the enactment of the 
UEBMI, NRCMI and URBMI, which can only be considered an important step in 
the pursuit of universalism.  
Another important step has been taken regarding the minimum living standard 
scheme (MLSS), which is an important move towards social inclusion in China. 
First, under the MLSS, the government takes responsibility for unemployment 
protection. Second, the emergence and universal implementation of the MLSS 
indicates a substantial development in terms of social rights. Third, efforts have been 
made to achieve transparency, justice and efficiency in policy implementation 
(Xiong 2014). The scheme is a step closer to a universalist principle of assistance. 
However, we should not exaggerate the impact of the scheme, because it remains 
implemented at the local level and is thus subject to local fiscal conditions, as well 
as local political willingness to enforce the policy. The cash-benefit level is also not 
considered generous enough to help the poorest residents out of poverty, as the 
replacement level is quite low and the incentives structure could result in perverse 
incentives. There is also a low degree of integration between the MLSS and other 
social policy schemes (Xiong 2014).  
If we view universalism as a spectrum, it appears that China has become more 
universal. However, in China the system is highly fragmented and social rights are 
defined and redefined at the local level, which means that universalism is likely to 
develop differently in different areas. This very subject is at the core of the 
aforementioned article by Huang (2015), which states that the explanation for 
subnational variation in China’s social health insurance is a result of central and 
local leaders’ policy choices. These policy choices stem both from a purely rational 
choice perspective – namely self-gain based on the desire to stay in power – but also 
from the desire to create a system that reflects the varying social risks existing 
across the country and to accommodate diverse local circumstances.  
‘Central leaders, who care about regime survival and stability, 
delegate substantial discretionary authority to local state agents to 
make coverage and generosity policies in social health insurance. 
They do this in order to accommodate diverse local circumstances 
while maintaining a hierarchy in social welfare provision that 
favours groups with political connections and influence. Under the 
framework set up by the centre, local officials, mindful of their 
political careers in the centralized personnel system, proactively 
design and implement social welfare policy according to local 
socio-economic conditions and to prevent social unrest in their 
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jurisdictions, which could put their career prospects in jeopardy. 
This results in differing levels of coverage and generosity in social 
health insurance across regions which reflect the diverse local 
socio-economic conditions, particularly local fiscal resources and 
social risk.’ 
(Huang 2015, 470-471, emphasis added) 
The massive disparities in coverage and generosity across China are also reflected in 
the rampant ‘welfare chauvinism’ that has come about as a result of unequal 
developments and living standards across the rural/urban boundary, facilitated by 
the hukou system, and between regions and provinces. The current large-scale 
internal migration in China does at times trigger a heuristic of deservingness, which 
divides the population into first- and second-class citizens – not unlike the 
discussion of citizenship rights of migrant workers in the EU (Kovacheva et al. 
2012; Kongshøj 2017; Jensen 2019).  
China is a unique country both in size and in terms of its internal developmental 
span. Just as it is not possible to talk about universalism as a single concept covering 
the Scandinavian countries, the same is true (and even more so) in China. There 
have nonetheless been attempts at building a ‘moderate’ universal welfare state, but 
not in the same way as we know it from the Scandinavian countries. Not 
surprisingly, Chinese history and culture play a pivotal role in this definition, just as 
was the case in the Nordic countries. 
When explaining the arrangements and trajectories of social welfare development, 
the society’s history, culture and institutions play an essential role (Rothstein 1998). 
Some also argue that ideas, norms and values determine the paths of welfare 
regimes. Compared with the Scandinavian welfare states or European welfare states 
in general, China is a latecomer to social welfare development and, as specified in 
section 4.1, their social development strategy has changed substantially several 
times. It is only in the past decade or so that there has been a growing interest in 
comparing different welfare systems and states.  
In China, welfare was mainly regarded as a residual public provision beyond the 
family, and only recently have people begun to feel that it is problematic that the 
government does not bear more responsibility when family and informal social 
networks do not meet the needs of individuals (Xiong 2014). It is this change in the 
population that has sparked the development of a harmonious society. 
In recent years, China has moved towards building a harmonious society and a 
welfare state built on ‘moderate’ universalism by maintaining a balance between 
economic growth and social development through the implementation of a wide 
range of social policy schemes. China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan for 2006–2010 in 
particular focused on building a harmonious (socialist) society by emphasising the 
expansion of welfare policies. Although the Chinese welfare system is more than a 
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legacy of Confucianism, these values have played a major role in recent policy 
reforms. The use of the term ‘harmonious society’ is an obvious reference to 
Confucian teachings. Following Solinger (2015, 977-978): 
‘Much has been made of the recent revival of Confucianism in the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), with its renewed promotion by 
the country’s political leadership since the turn of the century. 
Among the chief teachings of that doctrine is the principle that the 
government has an unshakeable mission to “nourish the people” 
(yangmin 养民) […] a term designating what was one of the most 
central precepts that the Master [Confucius] and his disciples set 
forth. […] Confucian precepts are several and can be drawn upon 
to legitimate variable actions.’  
In a paper by Chau and Yu (2013, 357), the question of de-familialisation is directly 
related to the discussion of the East Asian welfare regime, and they conclude that 
East Asia has moved away from its Confucian heritage as ‘there is almost a 
consensus that Confucianism in East Asia is no longer as influential as in the past’. 
During the 2000s, the literature on East Asian welfare regimes had largely 
abandoned the Confucian label, but with the Chinese focus on building a 
‘harmonious society’ through the expansion of welfare policies, it has to a large 
extent resurfaced. The concept of filial piety – a central concept in Confucius’ 
teachings – has experienced an even greater resurgence (Abrahamson 2017). There 
is some ambiguity, however, in finding an appropriate balance between state and 
family in China due to the realisation that filial piety cannot bear the burden of 
China’s looming ageing crisis. This can be illustrated by the rationale of a 
forthcoming system of ‘socialised elderly service’, described in the Twelfth Five-
Year Plan (2011–2015):  
‘To strengthen the system of socialised elderly service is the only 
road for adapting to the change of traditional old-age care for 
satisfying people’s needs of old-age care […] The shrinkage of 
family size and the change of family structure are contributing to 
the weakening of family care. This is leading to the increasing needs 
for professional institutions and community services.  
The Ministry of Civil affairs, translated in Lei & Walker (2013, 25) 
The acknowledgement that demographic changes are imminent and that the capacity 
for family care is eroding is obvious from the abovementioned quote. The inclusion 
of elder care as a state responsibility signals a more active state role in the future 
funding and delivery of social welfare (Lei & Walker 2013).  
As discussed earlier, Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare regimes triggered 
interest in Asian welfare programmes as part of an effort to classify non-Western 
welfare institutions. Esping-Andersen’s classic theory is primarily a historical-
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sociological theory, inspired by classical political economy. One critique of the 
theory – and a very relevant one in this context – is that the theory reduces cultural 
diversity to instrumental rationality by viewing cultural diversity as ideological 
solutions to fundamental issues of (de)commodification and stratification. Within 
social policy, the cultural legacy of Confucianism is debated and open for 
interpretation, as some social systems of Confucian-rooted societies have been 
rather different, while societies rooted in different cultural systems have more 
similar social systems (Wad 2001).  
In a report detailing China’s way towards a universal welfare state entitled 
‘Constructing a social welfare system for all in China’ written by the official 
Chinese think-tank (CDRF) reporting directly to the Chinese State Council, there are 
quotations from Confucius’s Book of Rites that directly draw parallels between the 
teachings of Confucius and ‘the mission of today’s social welfare system’ (CDRF 
2012, 4).  
The foundations for the CDRF report were laid during a study trip to Denmark, and 
in the report there are several references to Nordic policies that emphasise a Sino-
Nordic welfare dialogue and the opportunity for China to learn from the universal 
Scandinavian welfare states.  
As mentioned earlier, the Scandinavian countries are seen as the realisation of the 
universal welfare model, characterised by a comprehensive system of municipal care 
arrangements for the elderly and children. The state guarantees childcare and 
ensures that parents can secure care in public nurseries or kindergartens. Parents are 
thus relieved of the care burden, making it possible for Scandinavian women both to 
undertake labour market careers and to retain the main responsibility for raising 
children.  
The position regarding family policy and women in China is very different. Care for 
family members has traditionally been a family responsibility in accordance with 
more than 2000 years of filial piety within the Confucian tradition. However, given 
the current development in China – that is, low fertility and rapid migration – this 
model is facing severe challenges (Abrahamson 2015). One issue is that the practice 
of filial piety is difficult from a distance, and a second issue is that many families 
are plagued by the 4-2-1 phenomenon (four grandparents, two parents and one 
child). When families have only one child, it is not feasible for one daughter or 
daughter-in-law to care for (up to four) elderly parents, even if they live within the 
same geographical area.  
It makes sense to assume that these developments have brought about a rise in care 
opportunities, but that has not been the case, as argued by Du and Dong (2013, 132) 
‘the transition from a centrally planned to a market economy that was launched in 
1978 has led to a dramatic decline in publicly funded childcare programs’. In 
general, childcare services are underfunded and underdeveloped given current 
demand. In terms of elder care, a similar development has been taking place. Care 
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for the elderly has traditionally been a family affair; however, decreasing capacity to 
care for the elderly has opened a market (and an enormous overcapacity) in the 
private for-profit nursing home sector. Meanwhile, Abrahamson (2017) has argued 
that private nursing homes are only a solution for the better-off Chinese, while the 
capacity in affordable public nursing homes is much too small to meet demands, as 
most cities apply the 90-7-3 formula, which means that they aim for ‘90% cared in 
own home, 7% in community care and 3% in institutions’ (Abrahamson 2017, 95). 
This care deficit is a major issue in China, and several studies have shown that the 
presence of children and elders plays an important role in women’s labour market 
participation (Hare 2016). 
While the Chinese government seems to aim at retaining the practice of filial piety 
to some extent, it seems that the idea of a harmonious society or ‘nourishing the 
people’ is not at variance with the current policy climate. Solinger (2015, 996) 
argues that ‘It would seem that the state’s proclaimed Confucian pretensions may in 
this policy sector be just paper-thin at present—save for the mission of 
manufacturing “harmony”.’  
During the process of globalisation, the Chinese welfare state appears to have 
developed through a combination of rapid social changes, cultural traditions and 
institutional boundaries – and social policy has emerged as a tool to manage new 
social risks in the face of new international standards and demands (Xiong 2014). 
The Chinese welfare state now seems to be stuck in a quagmire as social policy 
confronts the dilemma between persistent institutions – including the hukou system 
– and new problems and social risks. During the process of urbanisation and 
industrialisation, the Chinese government has focused on strengthening the role of 
social policy and integrating the social security system across the rural/urban 
boundary, but this has not been without challenges and has not yet achieved 
complete success.  
Considering the overarching regional income disparity, fragmented social security 
system, diverse local circumstances, issues of fragmented social policy 
implementation and the complex social fabric embedded in a long tradition of 
Confucianism, it is safe to say that it will take time for China to create an inclusive 
and universal welfare system based on needs, egalitarianism and social justice.  
5.2.2.1 Transitional China 
There is broad agreement that the Chinese welfare state is transitioning, but the 
question remains: what is it transitioning from and towards what? In China, the 
welfare state is transitioning within many areas, and it is not merely a question of 
transitioning towards universalism. From a developmental perspective, the welfare 
system is moving from economy-driven development and reform towards more 
holistic development. From an economic perspective, the current social transition is 
a move from the danwei-based welfare system that existed under the planned 
economy towards a more market-oriented welfare system. From a social citizenship 
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perspective, it is moving from a dualistic and segregated rural-urban system towards 
an inclusive and integrated rural-urban welfare system.  
Transitional China will face challenges in speeding up the development of its social 
welfare system and expanding social rights and public support to satisfy the various 
demands of both urban and rural residents. Currently, there are insufficiencies of 
welfare and support within, but not limited to, the sectors of childcare, pensions and 
maternity. This in turn is placing great pressure on families in this transitional 
society, where expectations, as well as opportunities, are ever rising. It is a vicious 
cycle that could result in lower fertility, rapid ageing and population decline.  
In the transition period, the main characteristic (and weakness) of the Chinese 
welfare system lies in its fragmentation. This is particularly evident in the 
fragmented welfare system and hierarchical distribution of welfare across the hukou 
system and beyond. The dual social security system indicates that social groups in 
the upper classes enjoy a higher level of social security, while disadvantaged groups 
enjoy a lower level of social security, if they enjoy any at all. The fragmentation of 
social security breaks with the principle of providing support for those in need of 
social protection; furthermore, it undermines attempts to form a welfare state based 
on the social values of universality and equality.  
While it does not, at this time, seem possible for China to attain a universal welfare 
state in the manner of the Nordic states, there might be some merit to the idea of a 
‘moderate’ universal welfare state. If we treat universalism as a constant, rather than 
a spectrum or moving target, then no countries are universal. It would be difficult, 
but not impossible for China to work towards a moderate form of universalism that 
would be appropriate to meet the current challenges and conditions in China. What 
would be appropriate has yet to be determined.  
Whether this can truly be termed universalism is doubtful, and the Chinese welfare 
state might still best be described as existing in a state of institutional ambiguity 
between a residual and ‘moderate’ universal approach. However, the progress made 
in China speaks volumes for the country’s attempt to expand welfare services. While 
welfare services and provisions remain selective, the system has become more 
inclusive, and recent policy reforms have shown glimmers of a rights-based 
approach to assessing access to public goods even across the hukou system. To some 
extent, one might say that China’s recent social policy reforms point in a more 
‘universal’ direction, including, for example, the universal coverage for healthcare 
and pensions, the MLSS scheme, increased public responsibility and efforts to 
narrow social divisions. Institutional design towards a clear social objective, 
however, remains severely lacking in China. 
As of now, we believe that the principle of ‘moderate’ universalism in China has 
begun to address the following elements. First, expanding coverage to (nearly) the 
entire population in recent major policy reforms. Second, in line with the first 
element, the expansion of coverage is strengthening the idea of equal citizenship. 
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Welfare is no longer just for the urban population, just as it should cover not only 
the vulnerable groups in society. Finally, policymakers are showing a willingness to 
secure a dignified and decent living for the population, rather than guaranteeing the 
most basic standard of living. This new realm of policies is supposed to reflect 
principles such as democracy, equality, freedom and the rule of law (Gow 2017). 
We should keep in mind, though, that the conceptualisation of these principles is 
‘most contentious when compared with their common-sense meanings in western 
liberal political discourse’ (Gow 2017, 101). 
How, then, does China move forward? Transitional China must first strengthen the 
values of egalitarianism and the universality in building up its social security 
system. As stated by Rothstein, universalism fosters the experience that ‘“we” 
should solve “our” problems together’ (Rothstein 1994, 191). In this process, it is 
important to respect the cultural traditions of China. It is not feasible or sustainable 
to disregard the rich cultural heritage and its associated values when forming the 
future Chinese welfare state. Rather, China’s future could be a Confucian universal 
welfare state in the making.  
By establishing universal social welfare schemes, China can support and enhance 
labour market mobility and social mobility in its structural transformation and policy 
design. This could greatly enhance the social rights of migrant workers, not to 
mention those left behind; in turn, this could greatly aid the current demographic 
transition.   
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CHAPTER 6. SUMMARY  
6.1 Article A 
The Hukou Divide – a Passé Construct? 
 
Reference: Jensen, B.E. 2018. “The Hukou Divide: a Passé Construct”. Asia In 
Focus 5: 28-40. URL: http://asiainfocus.dk/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/AIF_ISSUE5_Jensen.pdf 
 
Article A departs from the current discussion of the abolishment of the hukou 
system. The articl argue that while the notion of the hukou system has lost 
importance in some areas, for instances in terms of economic inequality as some 
rural areas have become as affluent as some urban areas, which effectively dilutes 
the hukou divide in this aspect, it continues to carry great importance in determining 
people’s social citizenship status.  
This article contributes to the current discussion of the hukou system in three ways. 
Firstly, it assesses the development of inequality across the rural/urban divide, 
bringing in other dimensions beyond economic inequality. Secondly, it critically 
discusses the hukou divide from a social citizenship point of view, by relating recent 
social policy developments in China to the concept of social citizenship. Finally, it 
discusses the resilience of the system, drawing on van Oorschot's (2000) theory of 
‘deservingness’. It is argued that there is still a long way to go in terms of 
institutional reforms and that the hukou system may have made an impact on the 
deservingness heuristics of the Chinese population.  
The article concludes that the hukou system remains relevant in how social 
citizenship is granted in China in several ways: first, it serves not only to register the 
population, but also to stratify the population. Second, it controls population 
movements, as migration is conditional under the system and will often lead to 
social exclusion, as rural-to-urban migrant workers are left without the same rights 
as those with an urban hukou and are treated as a distinct undeserving group. Last, 
by definition it divides the population by creating a dual social citizenship and 
imposing perceptions of deservingness that bolster the divisions. 
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6.2 Article B 
‘Perceived social citizenship’: a comparative study between two different 
hukous 
 
Reference: Jensen, B.E. 2019. “‘Perceived Social Citizenship’: a Comparative Study 
Between two Different Hukous”. Citizenship Studies 23 (2):172-188. Doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2019.1584157 
 
 
Article B is in a sense a continuation of article A. Whereas article A examined how 
social citizenship is granted, article B examines social citizenship as a state of self-
awareness, or ‘perceived social citizenship’, with a specific focus on the elderly 
cohort in China.  
The article utilizes social exclusion theory to examine the prevalence of inequality 
and take-up issues with regard to access to the pension system and eldercare across 
the hukou system, as well as the effects thereof. The subjective dimension of 
‘perceived social citizenship’ is addressed by using Sen’s capability approach in 
tandem with the concept of social citizenship.  
The purpose of this article is two-fold: first, to discuss perceived social citizenship 
as a concept based on the capability approach; and second, to identify social 
exclusion (active and passive) in China throughout the life course and facilitated by 
the hukou system, and assess the effects hereof on ‘perceived social citizenship’. 
 
The inequalities embedded in the hukou system are likely to constrain the agency 
freedom of rural elders and subsequently undermine their opportunity equality. 
Furthermore, it limits the functionings of rural elders through a limited old-age 
pension system and perpetuates rural elders in a path-dependent sense of self-
providing resilience. They accept their identity as ‘old peasants’ and the connotation 
that comes with this, and they see their well-being as their own responsibility. Due 
to the hukou system, rural elders are restricted in terms of mobility as their welfare 
benefits are tied to their hukou and in many instances pooled at a local level, this 
potentially undermines the freedom of agency of rural elders because they are 
restricted from pursuing coveted goals; it further inhibits their possibility of 
developing their capabilities.  
 
This article concludes that the hukou system causes both active and passive 
exclusion. The institutional logic of the hukou system promotes widespread 
institutional diversity of social security in pensions and eldercare. Rural elders are 
being excluded by the Chinese welfare system and, due to the institutional logic of 
the hukou system, are not able to take advantage of their full potential with regard to 
their functionings, capability, and agency, in accordance with the capability 
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approach. Due to passive exclusion, they do not possess the autonomy necessary to 
develop the capacity to pursue coveted goals.  
 
6.3 Article C 
Pension reform in China: what can China learn from the Danish approach to 
demographic change?  
 
Reference: Jensen, B.E. 2019. “Pension reform in China: what can China learn from 
the Danish approach to demographic change?” Journal of China and International 
Relations 7 (1): 21-43. Doi:  https://doi.org/10.5278/jcir.v7i1.3541 
 
Article C examines China’s response to demographic transition, with a comparative 
focus on Denmark. The article seeks to examine how China can respond to its 
increasingly ageing population. The main focus is on investigating barriers and 
solutions, based on experiences gained from the Danish approach to demographic 
change, to creating a sustainable old-age pension system given the current 
demographic transition.  
The article outlines three factors from which China arguably could gain insights 
from Denmark in its attempt to meet the challenges of demographic change under 
current conditions; first, Chine needs to raise the retirement age, though in this 
process they should take notice of the Danish problem of a ‘one size fits all’ 
approach to pension age, which remains a major unresolved issue. Second, before 
postponing retirement, China needs to address ageism in society and create 
awareness about the demographic challenges. In this regard, Denmark had great 
success with framing seniors as ‘grey gold’ to encourage employers to retain and 
recruit seniors. Third, China need to realise that “pension reform begins with 
babies”. Pro-natal policies (along with net-immigration) are the main reason why 
Denmark (along with the other Scandinavian countries) has faced lees demographic 
pressure compared to other European countries, as their total fertility has remained 
comparatively high.  
The article concludes that the greatest lesson for China to learn from the Danish 
approach to demographic changes is that pensions should not be the sole focus; 
stimulating labour force participation, creating initiatives to postpose retirement and 
work longer and enforcing pro-natal polices are all part of the solution.  There is a 
need to create a comprehensive policy approach, which addresses the demographic 
challenges as a many-facetted issue in society. This is only possible if China 
addresses issues of care for the elderly, increasing the pension age, while at the same 
time addressing issues related to declining fertility and gender parity. 
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6.4 Article D 
Sources of support among the elderly in China: the changing roles of family 
and government  
 
Reference: Jensen, B.E.: Sources of support among the elderly in China: the 
changing roles of family and government. Manuscript. 
 
Article D examines the changing roles of family and government amidst the 
demographic transition. This study first examines familial values in a comparative 
context, as well as Chinese elder’s preference for living arrangements. Lastly, it 
examines which factors are related with familial eldercare values in China divided in 
two subcategories; values related to the family as (a) the provider of domestic care 
and (b) covering the cost hereof.   
The article shows that familial care values are strong in China, from a comparative 
perspective. From the perspective of the elderly Chinese, we find that 61.9 percent 
of those over the age of 60 years believe that the most desirable living arrangements 
for elderly people is with family.  
The article also show that those receiving care (56-65 and 66+ year olds) and those 
providing care (primarily and traditionally women) are not the ones holding the 
strongest familial eldercare values. 
The article concludes that these results likely signify the emergence of a new filial 
piety practice, which emphasizes the significance of the social security system for 
providing economic support to elderly people, yet affirms the responsibility of 
children to respect and support their parents.  
Filial piety holds an important place in Chinese tradition and belief system, in order 
to maintain the role of filial piety in modern China, young people, especially 
women, must be supported by the development of formal support systems beyond 
the family.  
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CHAPTER 7. TYING A KNOT: 
WELFARE STATE DEVELOPMENT AND 
DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION 
 
In this chapter, we will attempt to tie a knot on the threads we have woven together 
in the previous chapters and create a more coherent picture of their interrelatedness 
and provide an answer to our research questions. Demographic change, both in how 
it manifests itself and the ‘damage’ it is allowed to do, has demonstrated itself to be 
highly dependent on, first and foremost, the welfare state, but also on normative 
orientations.  
The relationship between social citizenship and demography is an overlooked area 
within citizenship studies, although a recent study by Torpey and Turner (Torpey 
and Turner 2017) has connected the two with a focus on immigration and social 
diversity. They argue that new forms of citizenship has emerged – namely ‘flexible 
citizenship’ or ‘semi-citizenship’ and so forth. Though this can be related to the 
Chinese case – not in terms of immigration, but internal migration – we would rather 
look at the relationship between demographic change, in this case mainly ageing, 
and social citizenship as a symbiotic relationship. 
It is well known by now that China is the first country in the world to be ageing 
without first having fully reached the status of a ‘developed country’. In a popular 
phrase – ‘China is growing old, before it is growing rich’. At this point in time, the 
significance of the demographic transition is not yet clear. First, there are many 
factors that can change the potential effects of demographic change, including 
changes in fertility patterns or family structures. In this dissertation, we have 
focussed on the welfare state as a possible mitigating effect on demographic change. 
Second, demographic change will not affect the country equally, as some parts of 
the country are very rich and highly developed, but many parts are not. Third, some 
parts of the country are becoming better adapted to handling the current 
demographic transition, while others severely lack institutional care and funding. 
This fragmentation is not news; it is a story as old as the PRC. Considering the 
magnitude of the looming ageing crisis, however, there is no room for social 
exclusion and dual welfare states, and this realisation has begun to dawn. A 
substantial body of public policy–oriented literature has emerged since the 2000s 
that has measured and proposed solutions to China’s demographic challenge. Many 
astute observations have concluded that the ageing burden will impose 
overwhelming challenges to the development of a Chinese welfare state, mainly in 
terms of the fragmented and fragile public pension system, as well as to China’s 
continued economic growth.  
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While there is no doubt that China’s rapid ageing will place tremendous pressure on 
the country’s economic health and fiscal conditions, we believe that there are a 
number of initiatives that can be enacted to defer the consequences of an ageing 
population or even compensate for the development. As argued in chapter 4, China 
has made great improvements in terms of welfare state development, and new 
reforms have focused on including the most vulnerable groups in society into the 
social welfare system. In other words, China’s rapid expansion of social insurance 
shows aspirations towards an inclusive welfare state, with more beneficiaries, as 
well as more contributors. Recent policy developments have shown that 
policymakers are acknowledging that it is not possible to maintain institutional 
status quo, and we have recently seen many measures that could potentially mitigate 
some of the effects of rapid population ageing. 
 
7.1 Conclusions 
The overall aim of this dissertation is to examine if and how the development of a 
‘moderate’ universal welfare state can relieve the burden associated with 
demographic transition in China. In the following section, the dissertation will first 
provide specific conclusions to the two sub-questions, before discussing the overall 
research question.  
Regarding the first sub-question: “What are the challenges to the development of 
Chinas social welfare system?” 
The dissertation finds that the main challenge to China’s social welfare system at 
this time is the hukou system or more specifically ‘social exclusion’. In articles A 
(‘The Hukou Divide – a Passé Construct?’) and B (‘“Perceived social citizenship”: a 
comparative study between two different hukous’), we argue that the hukou system 
can be considered an institutional logic of welfare segregation, in that it serves to 
stratify the population and control population movements, leading to social 
exclusion. However, more importantly, by definition, it divides the population by 
creating a dual social citizenship and imposing perceptions of deservingness that 
bolster these divisions – as such, it inhibits the citizenship status of a large part of 
the population.  
Although the hukou divide has been diminished in some respects, it is still thriving 
in terms of social citizenship. A policy design which favours inclusiveness and 
‘moderate’ universalism could foster equal social citizenship across China.  
Regarding the second sub-question: ‘How does welfare state development affect 
demographic change in China?’ 
In article C (‘Pension reform in China: what can China learn from the Danish 
approach to demographic change?’) the dissertation shows that China could 
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arguably learn from the Danish approach to demographic challenges in several 
ways. Denmark has adopted encompassing policy schemes to meet demographic 
changes and set up a sustainable approach to population ageing. The article shows 
that a long-term, sustainable solution should be found in a holistic welfare state 
approach to ageing – as has been the case in Denmark. This is only possible if China 
addresses the issues of elder care and increasing the pension age, while at the same 
time addressing issues related to declining fertility and gender parity. 
In article D (‘Sources of support among the elderly in China: the changing roles of 
family and government’) the dissertation shows that a new filial piety norm has 
emerged, one which emphasises the significance of the social security system for 
providing economic support to elderly people, yet affirms the responsibility of 
children to respect and support their parents. It appears that the younger generation 
is shifting their filial obligations to the state for the provision of financial support, 
Medicare and service provision, while the elderly generation are recognizing the 
burden placed on the young and in a show of intergenerational solidarity, they 
appease their filial piety expectations. However, as was also evident from article C, 
in order to support this development and maintain the important role of filial piety 
there is a need to address issues related to declining fertility and gender parity.  
To return to the overall research question, we find indications that the development 
of a ‘moderate’ universal welfare state could relieve the burden associated with 
demographic change in China, through a holistic welfare state approach to 
demographic change.  
The term ‘holistic’ is vague and it is difficult to pinpoint exactly what is needed to 
achieve this. Overall, what is meant, is a policy approach which goes beyond 
addressing ‘ageing’ from the perspective of the elderly. This can be achieved by for 
instances:    
- Creating a more favourable distribution of incomes through the 
process of urbanization.  
- Expanding social insurance coverage to secure more future 
contributors. 
- Fostering equal social citizenship across the rural/urban 
boundary. 
- Creating incentives to postpone retirement and work longer. 
- Stimulating labour force participation. 
- Setting up a more unified welfare system or a continual transfer 
system where risk and cost are more evenly distributed. 
- Enforcing pro-natal policies. 
Overall, this dissertation finds that by taking set ‘holistic’ approach to welfare state 
development, China could take advantage of enormous untapped labour market 
resources and lessen the demographic burden considerably in the future. We have 
identified these ‘untapped labour market resources’ as: migrants who are excluded 
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from the urban welfare system (see articles A and B); those over the age of 60 years 
who are subject to cultural expectations of being ‘old’ (see article C); and women 
who are excluded from the labour market due to a lack of policies regarding 
maternity, gender discrimination in hiring and a lack of formal care facilities for 
ageing family members (see article C & D).   
There is no doubt, that the bulk of these ‘untapped labour market resources’ are to 
be found amongst migrants and rural residents in general. Migrants and rural 
residents remain highly marginalised and excluded from large parts of the welfare 
system and are thereby demoted to second-rate citizens. Despite a shift in the 
inclusion of migrants into welfare systems in small- and medium-sized cities, they 
remain excluded from welfare schemes in the largest cities in China. Recent reforms 
of the Chinese welfare system have shown glimmers of a rights-based approach to 
social rights, which is one of the building blocks of citizenship (Saich 2017). The 
extension of coverage and generosity of the pension system and healthcare insurance 
in particular are examples of policy reforms that take steps towards a citizen-based 
approach to public service provision.  
Continued policy movement in this direction would resemble what Marshall (1950) 
terms ‘social citizenship’, which encompasses socioeconomic protection. Marshall 
posited a relationship between class and citizenship in terms of civil, political and 
social rights. An essential idea in Marshall’s theory was that obtaining political 
rights would yield social rights through the exercise of political power. The lack of 
political rights or a political voice remains a significant obstacle for migrants and 
rural residents in obtaining equal social rights, as argued by Saich (2017: 96): 
‘“Political citizenship” even at the local level still seems some way off’. Essentially, 
the expansion of social benefits depends on the largesse of the government.  
As stated in chapter 5, the basic criterion of universalism is equal citizenship and 
inclusion, which entails membership for all citizens (Kildal and Kuhnle 2005). All 
citizens for whom support is relevant are entitled to receive it. In China, there are 
opportunities to expand not just coverage, but also participation in welfare schemes. 
Higher participation among women, migrant and those over the age of 60 years, 
would result in more working-age contributors to social insurance programmes and 
thus a more solid foundation for the challenge of population ageing. Furthermore, 
creating a pension system that takes into account the lower income of migrants and 
their status as ‘floating’ (by creating incentives to participate with lower premiums 
and a continual transfer system of accumulated pension rights) could integrate this 
growing population group into the pension system. The pension system should take 
into account the socio-economic conditions and life plans of migrants. The current 
institutional barriers for insurance transfer and continuation will likely prove a 
challenge to the sustainability of the Chinese pension system, as it leaves many 
discouraged from joining pension programmes.  
As the population grows older, the need for healthcare will increase. The idea that 
rights of access to healthcare, among other social welfare provisions, apply equal to 
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all citizens, remains constrained by the hukou system and China’s legacy of 
citizenship distinction – a kind of welfare chauvinism, as discussed earlier. There 
can be no doubt that the magnitude of the imminent demographic transition could be 
mitigated by allowing the migrant masses access to healthcare in the place where 
they work. This is not merely dependent on policy reforms, however; greater notions 
of social solidarity between urban residents and migrant workers are key factors in 
realising this.  
We acknowledge that much depends on regulating the pension age, labour 
productivity of the shrinking workforce and other incremental policy changes. 
Recent policy reforms in China have alleviated a great deal of the institutional 
fragmentation that has plagued the welfare system for decades, but they have far 
from eradicated it. By strengthening universalism and thereby extending social 
citizenship to a greater portion of the population, it would be possible to mitigate 
some of the consequences of demographic change and secure a more sustainable 
approach to population ageing.  
To reiterate the quote by Lao Tzu from the beginning of this dissertation – ‘A 
journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step’. China has taken that all-
important first step in the development of their welfare state. We do not know what 
‘moderate’ universalism will mean in the future, we only know what it entails now; 
and for now, it is not enough to meet the imminent demographic crisis. The journey 
is not yet over – it has only just begun. 
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